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PRIOR AND RELATED APPEALS 
The Utah State Engineer is aware of no prior or related appeals in this 
matter. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Plaintiffs appeal from the Seventh District Court's order on de novo review 
of two change applications for approved water rights. The Utah Court of Appeals 
has jurisdiction to hear this appeal, transferred from the Utah Supreme Court, 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)G) (West Supp. 2014) . 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
Issue 1: On the district court's review by trial de novo for two change 
applications, did the court properly conclude that there is reason to believe the 
Green River has sufficient unappropriated water for the change applications? 
Standard of Review: Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-8 (West Supp. 2014) 
provides the legal measure against which applications submitted to the State 
Engineer are approved or denied. Change applications for water rights measured 
against statutory criteria often involve technical and complex factual evidence. 
The trial court on de novo review, weighs the evidence against the statute and 
makes findings of fact and conclusions of law to determine whether there is 
"reason to believe" the application meets the criteria and should be approved. 
Deciding this type of question on appeal-whether the facts fall within the ambit 
1 
of the statute-is a mixed question of fact and law. The standard of review for 
such mixed questions in water applications has been examined and defined by 
Searle v. Milburn Irrigation Co., 2006 UT 16, ,r 15, 133 P.3d 382. See also In re 
Adoption of Baby B., 2012 UT 35, iJ 42 308 P.3d 382. 
In Searle, the Utah Supreme Court examined the standard of review where a 
trial court rejected a change application based on the "impairment" criterion of 
section 73-3-8. The Searle Court reviewed the issue as a mixed question of fact 
and law because "the district court must first find facts relevant to the issue of 
impairment and then determine whether those facts are within the ambit of 
'impairment' such that the change application should be rejected [or approved]." 
Searle, 2006 UT 16, at ,r 15, (citing Jensen v. IHC Hasps., 2003 UT 51, ,r 57 n. 11, 
82 P.3d 1076 ("A mixed question involves ... the determination of whether a 
given set of facts comes within the reach of a given rule of law." (internal 
quotation marks omitted))); cf Butler, Crockett & Walsh Dev. Corp. v. Pinecrest 
Pipeline Operating Co., 2004 UT 67, ,r 43, 98 P.3d 1 (reviewing a district court's 
determination that water was put to beneficial use as a mixed question of fact and 
law). 
Thus, examining whether an application meets the statutory criteria is a 
mixed question of law and fact where trial courts are given "significant, but not 
broad discretion" in applying this statute to given facts with the reason-to-believe 
2 
standard. Searle, 2006 UT 16 at ,r 18 ( citing Pinecrest Pipeline Operating Co., 
y) 2004 UT 67, iJ 50). 
Further, under In re Adoption of Baby B., 2012 UT 35 at iJ 42, in mixed 
questions of law and fact, the appellate court's review "depends on the nature of 
the issue and the marginal costs and benefits of a less deferential, more heavy-
handed appellate touch." Because "( m ]ixed question fall somewhere in the 
twilight between deferential review of findings of fact and searching 
reconsideration of conclusions of law," the Baby B. court examined a sliding scale 
of sorts to measure the degree of deference to afford trial courts for mixed 
questions, stating that "[ o ]n mixed questions ... our review is sometimes 
deferential and sometimes not." Id. The degree of deference afforded the trial 
court depends on: (1) the degree of variety or complexity of the facts to which the 
legal rule is applied, (2) the degree to which the trial court's application of the 
legal rule relies on facts observed by the trial judge that cannot be adequately 
reflected in the record for appellate review, and (3) other policy reasons that weigh 
for or against granting discretion to trial courts. Id. Under these factors, each of 
the section 73-3-8 criteria for a change application weighs in favor of giving 
significant discretion to the trial court's decision. 
Considering the Baby B. factors, the "unappropriated water" analysis 
depends on both questions of law-the meaning of section 73-3-8(1)(a)(i) in the 
3 
change application context-and technical and complex questions of fact. The 
trial court's ruling on this point necessarily construed the statutory appropriation 
criterion in the change application context. Thus, because the trial court's 
application of facts to its conclusions of law was both technical and complex, this 
Court should afford the trial court significant but not broad discretion in 
determining whether it had reason to believe there is unappropriated water in the 
Green River for the change applications. 
Preservation: R. 10-12; R. 622-628 (attached as Add. A). 
Issue 2: On the district court's review by trial de novo for two change 
applications, did the court properly conclude that there is reason to believe the 
applications would not unreasonably affect public recreation and the natural 
stream environment? 
Standard of Review: See standard of review for Issue 1. Using the three 
Baby B. factors, the complexity of the record facts subject to the section 73-3-8 
criterion militates for broad discretion to the trial court's determination that the 
change applications would not unreasonably affect public recreation and the 
natural stream environment. 
Preservation: R. 22-24; R. 640-644 (Add A). 
4 
Issue 3: On the district court's review by trial de novo for two change 
~ applications, did the court properly conclude that there is reason to believe the 
applicant has the financial ability to complete the proposed works? 
Standard of Review: See standard of review for Issue 1. Because the facts 
were relatively straightforward, the trial court's construction and application of the 
section 73-3-8(1)(a)(iv) financial ability criterion should be afforded significant 
but not broad discretion. 
Preservation: R. 18-20; R. 636-638 (Add. A). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann.§ 73-3-3(5)(a) (West Supp. 2014): 
73-3-3. Permanent or temporary changes in point of diversion, place of use, 
or purpose of use. 
* * * * 
(5) (a) The state engineer shall follow the same procedures, and the rights 
and duties of the applicants with respect to applications for permanent changes of 
point of diversion, place of use, or purpose of use shall be the same, as provided in 
this title for applications to appropriate water. 
**** 
Utah Code Ann.§ 73-3-8(1) (West Supp. 2014): 
73-3-8. Approval or rejection of application -- Requirements for approval --
Application for specified period of time -- Filing of royalty contract for 
removal of salt or minerals. 
(1) (a) It shall be the duty of the state engineer to approve an application if: 
(i) there is unappropriated water in the proposed source; 
(ii) the proposed use will not impair existing rights or interfere with the 
more beneficial use of the water; 
5 
(iii) the proposed plan is physically and economically feasible, unless the 
application is filed by the United States Bureau of Reclamation, and would 
not prove detrimental to the public welfare; 
(iv) the applicant has the financial ability to complete the proposed works; 
and 
(v) the application was filed in good faith and not for purposes of 
speculation or monopoly. 
(b) (i) If the state engineer, because of information in the state engineer's 
possession obtained either by the state engineer's own investigation or 
otherwise, has reason to believe that an application to appropriate water will 
interfere with its more beneficial use for irrigation, domestic or culinary, 
stock watering, power or mining development, or manufacturing, or will 
unreasonably affect public recreation or the natural stream environment, or 
will prove detrimental to the public welfare, it is the state engineer's duty to 
withhold approval or rejection of the application until the state engineer has 
investigated the matter. 
(ii) If an application does not meet the requirements of this section, it 
shall be rejected. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case. This is an appeal from a trial court decision approving 
two Change Applications (Change Applications or Applications), designated on 
the State Engineer's files as 89-74 (a35402) and 09-462 (a35874), filed 
respectively by Kane County Water Conservancy District and San Juan Water 
Conservancy District (the Districts). The State Engineer's orders approving the 
Applications resulted from routine informal adjudicative proceedings under Utah 
Code Ann. § 73-3-8 (West Supp. 2014). The trial court, in a consolidated case on 
both Applications, reviewed the Applications by trial de novo as the Utah 
6 
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Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-402(l)(a) (West Supp. 
2014), requires. 
Course of Proceedings. The Districts initiated two informal adjudicative 
proceedings in 2009 by filing two Change Applications with the State Engineer's 
office. Kane County Water Conservancy District, on March 30, 2009, filed 
Application for Permanent Change of Water a35402, based on approved Water 
Rights 89-74, 89-1285, and 89-1513 (Kane Application). Ex. 5. San Juan Water 
Conservancy District, on August 27, 2009, filed Application for Permanent 
Change of Water a35874, based on approved Water Right 09-462 (San Juan 
Application). Ex. 1. The Applications sought to change the original points of 
diversion and the places of use for the underlying water rights to a single location 
on the Green River and to add storage capacity to facilitate use for power 
vjj) generation. Ex. 5 at 1-4; Ex. 1 at 1-3. Both districts leased their water rights to 
Blue Castle Holdings, Inc. (Blue Castle), Ex. 9 A, 9C, and 1 0A, or to a predecessor 
who assigned the lease to Blue Castle, for use in power generation. Ex. 9B and 
l0B. The leases, for terms of forty or more years, are contingent on filed and 
approved changes. Ex. 9A at ,r,r 2, 6-9; Ex. 9C at ,r,r 2, 6-9; Ex. l0A at ,r,r 2, 
vii 
7-10. 
After the State Engineer advertised the Applications, as Utah Code Ann. § 
,,ijJ) 
73-3-6 (West Supp. 2014) requires, Ex. 6 at 1 and Ex. 2 at 1, protestors filed forty-
7 
nine protests, including four late protests, on the Kane Application, Ex. 6 at 1-2, 
and twenty-seven protests, including three late protests, on the San Juan 
Application. Ex. 2 at 1. The State Engineer held an informal administrative 
hearing on each Application in Green River, Utah, on January 12, 2010. Ex. 6 at 2; 
Ex. 2 at 2. He approved the Applications in separate orders on January 20, 2012. 
Ex. 6 at 22; Ex. 2 at 22. 
Plaintiffs sought de novo review of both orders in the Seventh Judicial 
District Court. R. at 4 Gurisdiction claimed under Utah Code Ann. §§ 63G-4-402, 
-404, (West 2009 & Supp. 2014) and Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-14 (West Supp. 
2014) and named Kent Jones, the Utah State Engineer, as a respondent under Utah 
Code Ann. § 73-3-14(2)). The court approved the applications by final order 
entered April 21, 2014. R. 648-49 (Add. A). The court's thoughtful 36-page 
order found facts and made conclusions of law on each statutory criterion against 
which change applications are measured. R. 621-48. Employing a reason-to-
believe standard, R. 619-20, the court ruled that the Applications met the statutory 
criteria, R. 648-49, and approved them subject to enumerated conditions. R. 648-
49 (Add. A). Appellants, unsuccessful protestants in the State Engineer's 
administrative process and plaintiffs in the district court, now appeal to this Court. 
Statement of Relevant Facts. The water rights that underlie the two 
Change Applications, initially appropriated for steam power generation at a coal-
8 
fired power plant, are located in three water sources. Ex. 5 at 1, ,r 2C; Ex. 1 at 1, il 
5. The Kane County Water Conservancy District (Kane) water rights had prior 
sources of supply in both Wahweap Creek and Lake Powell. Ex. 5 at 1, iJ 2C. The 
San Juan County Water Conservancy District (San Juan) water right originated in 
the San Juan River. Ex. 1 at 1, ,r 5. Kane and San Juan applied to move the water 
rights from these smaller tributaries and Lake Powell upstream to the Green River 
for Blue Castle's use. Ex. 5 at 2-3, ,r 5B and C; Ex. 1 at 2, ,r,r 15, 17. The Green 
River, which is the largest tributary to the Colorado River, is in turn fed by several 
tributaries below the Flaming Gorge Reservoir including the Yampa River, the 
Duchesne River, the White River, the Price River, and the San Rafael River, 
before it joins the Colorado River. Ex. 20 at 3; see also Ex. 67. The Applications 
sought to divert water from the Green River below the city of Green River, Utah, 
~ and below all the significant tributaries except the San Rafael River. Ex. 5 at 2-3, 
il 5B-C; Ex. 1 at 2, ilil 15, 17. 
The matter before the trial court on de novo review was the same matter the 
State Engineer considered-whether to approve or reject the Districts' 
Applications and what conditions to impose if the applications were approved. 1 A 
1 Such de novo review essentially put the trial court in the shoes of the State 
Engineer to evaluate the Applications anew against the section 73-3-8 criteria. 
Archer v. Bd of State Lands & Forestry, 907 P.2d 1142, 1144-45 (Utah 1995); 
Searle v. Milburn Irrigation Co. 2006 UT 16, ,r 34, 133 P.3d 382 (quoting United 
States v. Dist. Court, 238 P.2d 1132, 1137 (Utah 1951)) ('"[T]he decision of the 
9 
trial court decides anew whether to approve or reject administrative applications. 
Unlike the State Engineer's administrative decisions, however, trial and appellate 
courts are courts of law and, upon judicial review of State Engineer orders, their 
decisions "become the law of the case, are res judicata, and are binding precedent 
on the law the same as other decisions by such courts on other matters."2 E. Bench 
Irrigation Co. v. State, 300 P.2d 603, 606 (Utah 1956). Likewise, trial de novo 
presents the district court with "the opportunity to correct any deficiencies that 
may arise because of the informal nature of administrative proceedings and 
provides an adequate record for future review." Archer v. Bd. of State Lands & 
Forestry, 907 P.2d 1142, 1144-1145 (Utah 1995). Plaintiffs, under section 73-3-
14(2) of the Utah Code, must join the State Engineer as a defendant in the trial 
court's de novo review. As a statutory defendant, he carries no burden of 
court on review, except for the formalities of the trial and judgment is of the same 
nature and for the same purpose [as that of the State Engineer]."'). 
The State Engineer, under section 73-3-14(2) of the Utah Code, must be 
joined as a defendant in the trial court's de novo review and may find himself in 
one of three general postures. First, he may align with a successful applicant. 
Second, he may stand alone or with protestants against a denied applicant. Third, 
he may stand alone or align with protestants against an unhappily restricted 
successful applicant. In the present case, he was aligned with the successful 
applicant and his role on de novo review was to explain his reasoning and 
administrative order to the trial court to fully inform the court on the Applications, 
their complexities, and how they will affect the water system and other uses. 
2 Presumably the Utah Supreme Court's reference to "binding precedent" 
applies only to appellate court decisions. 
10 
·vi) 
persuasion, a burden borne at all times by the applicant. Searle, 2006 UT 16 at ,r 
54 ("[T]he burden of persuasion remains on the change applicant throughout the 
application process."). The trial court, on de novo review, finds facts and 
determines whether those facts fall within the reach of section 73-3-8. If the facts 
show that the application meets the statutory criteria, the court approves the 
application. In deciding this mixed question of law and fact, the trial court 
necessarily construes the language of section 73-3-8. 
Whether the relevant facts in this matter fulfill the section 73-3-8 criteria 
informs the State Engineer's performance of his duties with respect to similar 
applications, and aids him in applying the relevant statutes to daily administrative 
operations and decisions. In this matter, the State Engineer believes the trial court 
construed and applied the criteria appropriately. Because Plaintiffs have not 
--s) shown that the record evidence fails to support the reasonable belief that the 
criteria are met, there is no ground to disturb the district court's decision. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Blue Castle, on behalf of the applicant Districts, demonstrated, based on a 
reason-to-believe standard of proof, that the Applications meet each of the section 
73-3-8 approval criteria. The court examined those criteria, involving findings of 
unappropriated water, public welfare, and applicant financial ability, and others. 
The court, after trial de novo, made findings of fact and conclusions of law on 
11 
each issue. Because weighing facts against statutory criteria in water application 
cases present mixed questions of law and fact, the district court's findings and 
conclusions are generally due significant though not broad deference. 
Evidence before the trial court showed that there is unappropriated water in 
the Green River, which is the proposed source of supply for the changed water 
rights. The trial court determined there is unappropriated water available for Blue 
Castle's use in the Green River. R. 627-628 (Add. A). 
Likewise, the court properly concluded that the proposed diversion to 
supply Blue Castle's power plant project will not unreasonably affect public 
recreation or the natural stream environment. Although the trial court carefully 
evaluated these issues as independent factors in approval, that evaluation 
illustrated judicial care rather than statutory necessity. 
The trial court also determined applicants' project is financially feasible and 
that they have the financial ability to complete it. Plaintiffs touch on several other 
section 73-3-8 criteria which they fail to identify in their stated issues. The trial 
court appropriately ruled in applicants' favor with respect to each criterion, and 
therefore reasonably approved the Applications. This Court, affording the trial 
court significant deference for these mixed questions, should affirm. 
12 
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I. 
ARGUMENT 
THE REASON-TO-BELIEVE STANDARD IS MEANINGFUL, BUT 
LOW 
The Utah State Engineer, as the state's authority on water and director of the 
Division of Water Rights, is "responsible for the general administrative 
supervision of the waters of the state and the measurement, appropriation, 
~ apportionment, and distribution of those waters." Utah Code Ann. § 73-2-1(3)(a) 
(West Supp. 2014); see also Utah Code Ann.§§ 73-2-1.1, 73-2-1.2 (West 2004). 
Utah citizens apply to the State Engineer's office to acquire new water rights 
where water is available, and where it is not, for approval to change the use of 
existing water rights. Utah Code Ann.§§ 73-3-1(1), 73-3-2, 73-3-3 (West Supp. 
2014). Whether the submitted application is to acquire or to change a water right, 
the standard of review is the same: whether there is "reason to believe" the 
application complies with the applicable statutory criteria. Searle v. Milburn 
Irrigation Co., 2006 UT 15, ilil 31, 43-46. The district court, conducting a trial de 
novo of an application, also determines application approval under this reason-to-
believe standard. Id. at ilil 35, 42. 
Plaintiffs correctly cite to Searle for the principle that, in the trial court, the 
statutory requirements provide a "meaningful barrier so that the floodgates remain 
..,Ji) closed to all applications except those with a sufficient probability of successful 
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perfection." 2006 UT 15, at iJ 45. They also correctly point out that, under Searle, 
the applicant bears the burden of persuasion throughout the application process. 
Aplt. Brief at 32. However, they omit from their Searle explanation that reason-
to-believe is a relatively low hurdle meant to encourage maximizing beneficial 
use. The Supreme Court said: 
Although at first blush it appears that this procedure unjustly 
favors new appropriations and new uses to the detriment of vested 
rights, the procedure actually provides a balance between the two 
policy goals of putting water to the most beneficial use possible while 
simultaneously guarding vested rights. The procedure accomplishes 
this by placing a fairly low burden on a party seeking approval of a 
change application, thereby allowing the party to attempt to perfect 
the right to use the water in the manner contemplated by the 
application. If such use can be accomplished without interfering with 
vested rights, the policy of putting water to the best use possible is 
furthered without causing injury to anyone. 
2006 UT 16, at iJ 36 (internal citations omitted). The Court also acknowledged 
that, "[t]he value of allowing experimentation cannot be understated." Id. at iJ 38. 
A change application, after all, is not the final adjudication of a water right, 
and the burden of persuasion used to determine compliance with statutory criteria 
is akin to, but distinct from, the probable cause standard in criminal cases. Id. at 
,I,I 33, 46-47. "Determining whether an applicant has, in fact, proven that the new 
manner of use does not impair vested rights is a matter ultimately left to a final 
judicial determination of rights," the Court noted. Id. at iJ 37. Likewise, 
"[p ]ursuing a policy that allows experimentation with water use is not antithetical 
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to a strong and legitimate desire to protect the vested rights of other water users." 
~ Id. at ,I 39. For change applications, the reason-to-believe standard with the 
section 73-3-8 criteria is relatively low to allow for experimentation and promote 
the "utmost" development of water. Id. at ,I 37 (citing Eardley v. Terry, 77 P.2d 
362, 366-67 (1938)). 
The trial court appropriately applied the Searle standard when it granted the 
Applications. Plaintiffs make bare quotations to Searle without analysis or 
citation to the record. They pick and choose their references in a simplistic and 
incorrect fashion. Aplt. Brief at 31-33. They conclude by saying that "far from 
meeting the Applicants' burden of persuasion, the application is incomplete and 
does not provide the necessary statutory information to support an approval by the 
State Engineer." Aplt. Brief at 33. Plaintiffs err. They fail to marshal any of the 
evidence that contradicts their assertions. They likewise fail to quote the relevant 
language from the Searle opinion. They fail to provide citations to the record 
supporting their argument or identifying issue preservation. And they even fail to 
correctly address their arguments to the trial court's decision rather than the State 
Engineer's approval process. This Court should not take seriously Plaintiffs' 
baseless conclusion that the Applications fail to meet the criteria for approval. 
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II. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THERE IS 
REASON TO BELIEVE THE CHANGE APPLICATIONS MEET 
THE SECTION 73-3-8 CRITERION FOR UNAPPROPRIATED 
WATER 
In Utah water belongs to the public. Utah Code Ann.§ 73-1-1(1) (West 
Supp. 2014). All potential users must apply to the State Engineer for authority to 
withdraw water from the natural environment. Id. § 73-3-1(1), (2) (West Supp. 
2014). Water rights depend on beneficial water use. Id. § 73-1-3 (West 2004); id. ~, 
§ 73-3-1 ( 4). Compliance with mandated criteria ascertained by the State Engineer 
or trial court on de novo review determines application approval. Id. §§ 73-3-8, - Gv 
10 (West Supp. 2014). Here the Districts hold approved applications to 
appropriate water. See Ex. 4 at 1, Ex. 8A-8C; R. 626 (Add. A). Such approved 
applications may be changed in the same manner as perfected water rights. Utah 
Code Ann.§ 73-3-3(8)(a) (West Supp. 2014). 
Changeable characteristics of water rights include the point of diversion, 
place of use, and purpose of use, id. § 73-3-3(2)(a), and a change application to the 
State Engineer initiates an informal administrative proceeding governed by both 
water statutes and the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA). Id. §§ 73-3-
3, -5, -6 to -16 (West 2004 & Supp. 2014); id. §§ 63G-4-101 to -601 (West 2009 
& Supp. 2014); Utah Admin. Code R. 655-6-2. Statutes and case law direct the 
State Engineer to scrutinize change applications as he would new applications. Id. ~ 
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§ 73-3-3(5)(a) (West Supp. 2014); Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497,499,502 
;;; (Utah 1989). Applying the appropriation criteria to change applications requires 
an understanding of change applications. The trial court correctly approved the 
Applications because there was reason to believe the Applications meet the 
statutory criteria in section 73-3-8. 
For applications to appropriate water for a new water right, section 73-3-
8(l)(a)(i) requires a finding of ''unappropriated water in the proposed source." In 
Bonham v. Morgan, the Utah Supreme Court said that all of the section 73-3-8 
criteria also apply to applications to change existing water rights. Bonham v. 
Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 502 (Utah 1989); Utah Code Ann.§ 73-3-3(5)(a) (West 
Supp. 2014). Applying the section 73-3-8 criteria, both the State Engineer and the 
trial court correctly determined that there was reason to believe the Districts' 
..i; Change Applications met the requirements for approval, including the need for 
unappropriated water in the proposed source. 
Compliance with this criterion depends on the trial court's findings 
concerning complex facts. Construction of the statute in the context of change 
applications is, however, more law-like than fact-like. In re Adoption of Baby B., 
2012 UT 35 at, 42. The trial court's conclusions of law on the abstract legal 
question of what constitutes "unappropriated water" may therefore be afforded 
less deference than the significant discretion given the trial court on whether the 
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complex facts are within the reach of the stated legal rule. The trial court did 
correctly interpret the statutory criterion and, applying the facts to that standard, 
reached a reasonable belief that unappropriated water is available for the 
Applications in the Green River. 
A. The district court correctly concluded that water is available in 
the Colorado River system under Utah's Colorado River 
allocation 
Section 73-3-8(l)(a)'s first criterion is that "there is unappropriated water in 
the proposed source[.]" Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-8(1)(a)(i) (West Supp. 2014). As 
a matter of fact and law, the trial court reasonably held that unappropriated water 
exists for the Districts' Change Applications. As the trial court put it, "there are at 
least 574,600 acre-feet of approved yet undeveloped water in the Upper Colorado 
River Basin in Utah." R. 623 (Add. A). The court found that "[m]ost of this 
574,600 acre-feet of water has not been applied to beneficial use, and it is 
unappropriated water available for use by those with approved applications at least 
up to the limit of Utah's Colorado River allocation." R. 623 ,r,r 27, 28 (Add. A). 
Although the State Engineer commonly uses the term "unappropriated" to mean 
only water for which no applications to appropriate are outstanding, he recognizes 
and does not object to the trial court's use of "unappropriated" water as 
synonymous with undeveloped water ( water not actually applied to a beneficial 
use). R. 576-578. 
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Utah has, on average, 1.4 Million Acre Feet (MAF) of water per year 
~ available under the Colorado River Compact. R. 668 at 81: 9-12; R. 669 at 271: 
21 - 272:7. More than that amount has been approved for use on the State 
Engineer's records, but development of Colorado River water rights lags 
significantly behind approvals. R. 668 at 87: 14- 88: 15; R. 669 at 271 :21 -
272:18; R. 669 at 274:8-15. Thus, notwithstanding Plaintiffs' confusing claims to 
the contrary, Aplt. Brief at 19-26, a portion of the Colorado River water allocated 
to Utah by the Upper Colorado River Compact remains unused-Utah water users 
currently deplete only about one MAF of the 1.4 MAF of water available to them 
under current hydrologic conditions. R. 668 at 84: 19-22; R. 669 at 273 :24 -
274:13. In other words, the water rights that underlie the Change Applications are 
part of Utah's allocated, but not yet developed, Colorado River supply. 
The trial court correctly concluded that average Green River flows are 
sufficient and Utah's allocation is not yet fully developed. 3 Water for Blue 
Castle's use is physically available from the Green River as part of Utah's 
Colorado River allocation at Blue Castle's proposed place of use under the 
Districts' Change Applications. Thus, there is unappropriated water available in 
the proposed source for the Change Applications. 
3 Further, the Green River typically flows with 3.9 MAF per year, with base 
flows ranging between 1,800 and 3,000 cubic feet per second in an average water 
year. R. 668 at 95:25 - 97:3; R. 624 (Add. A). 
19 
But even if the Green River did not have unappropriated water at the newly 
proposed place of use, water made available by relinquishing the prior place of use G 
under the Districts' approved appropriation applications could provide the basis 
for approval of their Change Applications under section 73-3-8(l)(a)(i). As the 
trial court stated, 
The question of unappropriated water is directly relevant when 
considering an application to appropriate. But when evaluating a 
change application ... the issue of unappropriated water cannot be 
applied in exactly the same way. The water involved in a change 
application is already approved for use. The change applicant seeks 
to change an already approved use, either in terms of "point of 
diversion, place of use, or purpose of use." §73-3-3(l)(a). 
R. 626 (Add. A). 
Most change applications are filed in water systems where all of the water 
has been previously appropriated and is often fully beneficially used. The 
required "unappropriated water" for a change application comes from the 
relinquished, hydrologically-connected prior use. This "swap" allows "new" uses 
to be met. Logically, where unappropriated water is present in a system and there 
is not a queue of approved, but undeveloped, applications for beneficial use, there 
is no need to change existing water rights-only to appropriate the unappropriated 
water. Here, by contrast, there is a queue of approved, but undeveloped, 
applications. The Bonham opinion does not comment on evaluating 
"unappropriated water" in the change context. But if unappropriated water is not 
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available in a particular water system, the water delivered under an applicant's 
\41) hydrologically-connected, existing water right may serve as the equivalent of the 
"unappropriated water" in the proposed source. 
The trial court, in its final order, recognized that "all water tributary to the 
Colorado River Basin [is] hydrologically connected." R. 622 (Add. A). Because 
"the water involved in a change application is already approved for use," R. 626 
(Add. A), the trial court appropriately concluded, "Approval of the Applications 
does not constitute a new appropriation of water within the Colorado River 
Basin." R. 627 (Add. A). The Applications are instead new diversions from the 
Green River, which is part of that Basin." R. 627 (Add. A) (emphasis added). 
Consistent with this reasoning, the Utah Supreme Court has also recognized 
that changes in places of diversion and use derive from existing water rights in 
viJ hydrologically-connected water sources. Rocky Ford Irrigation Co. v. Kents Lake 
Reservoir Co., 135 P.2d 108 (Utah 1943). Rocky Ford Irrigation Co. involved a 
change application by Kents Lake Reservoir Company to move half the amount of 
a storage water right from a Beaver River tributary, the "South Fork," to the 
Beaver River itself, at a place called "Three Creeks." The entire amount of the 
rights was not usually available on the South Fork tributary, and the applicant 
must have hoped, before arriving at the Supreme Court, that moving half of its 
right to Three Creeks would allow it to take the full amount of water the right 
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seemed to allow. The Supreme Court, however, held, "In support of the proposed 
change the defendant admits, as well it must, that storage under the transferred 
rights must be limited to the amount that would have been available to [applicant] 
Ken ts Lake for storage at the present South Fork location during the same period." 
Id. at 111 (internal citation omitted). Likewise, "[t]he combined storage at South 
Fork and at Three Creeks could not exceed the total amount available for storage 
at that time in the South Fork." Id. at 111. For change applications, where the 
water sources are hydrologically connected, the prior location's water provides the 
basis, the measure, and the limit for the beneficial use in the new location. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-3 (West 2004). 
Here, the prior places of use for the Change Applications are hydrologically 
connected to the new place of use on the Green River. R. 627 (Add. A). Thus, as 
long as Blue Castle and the Districts forego use in the prior places of use and 
withdraw only the same amount of water in the new place-according to priority 
and in a manner that does not impair other vested water rights-their existing 
water rights may be considered the equivalent of "unappropriated water" in the 
proposed source for change application purposes. Consequently, whether or not 
the trial court properly determined there is actual undeveloped and thus 
"unappropriated water" in Green River, the change could be approved because, as 
in Rocky Ford Irrigation Co., Blue Castle's use at the new proposed place of 
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diversion will be limited, both in terms of volume and priority date, to the amount 
v.;d) of water available at the original place of diversion. On either basis, this Court 
can affirm the trial court's determination that there is reason to believe that 
unappropriated water is available in the proposed source. 
B. Plaintiffs' arguments based on flows from the Flaming Gorge 
Reservoir do not invalidate the district court's conclusion 
Plaintiffs argue, incorrectly, that water withdrawals under the change on the 
Green River must rely on releases from the Flaming Gorge Reservoir. Aplt. Brief 
ViJ at 21, Heading 1 ("[the Applications] improperly rely on instream flow releases 
from Flaming Gorge Reservoir measured according to the requirements of the 
Endangered Species Act, as the basis for claiming unappropriated water." 
(capitalization altered)). Plaintiffs claim that "[fJlows in the Green River are 
controlled by the Flaming Gorge Reserv~ir Operation Plan"4 and "no releases 
from the reservoir are authorized during periods of low flow except for flows 
designated as minimum instream flows under the Endangered Species Act [ESA]." 
Aplt. Brief at 21. Further, Plaintiffs assert that "all releases from Flaming Gorge 
Reservoir are intended to be left in the river undiverted from the point of release to 
4 Plaintiffs supply no record citations to support these claims. The State 
Engineer is unaware of a trial exhibit entitled "Flaming Gorge Operation Plan" 
except as the "Operating Plan" may relate to a submitted Bureau of Reclamation 
Record of Decision. See Ex. 20, Bureau of Reclamation Record of Decision, 
Operation of Flaming Gorge Dam, Final Environmental Impact Statement, 
February, 2006. 
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Lake Powell in order to maintain and restore designated critical habitat. Operating 
Plan, 1.1, Appendix 2." Aplt. Brief at 26. 
Not only are Plaintiffs' assertions insufficiently supported, but their logical 
premises are flawed. First, without appropriate supporting documentation from 
Plaintiffs, the State Engineer can find no evidence in the record that water releases 
from Flaming Gorge Reservoir must remain undiverted. Even assuming Plaintiffs' 
"Operating Plan" is likely the 2006 "Record of Decision, Operation of Flaming 
Gorge Dam, Final Environmental Impact Statement,'' submitted as Trial Exhibit 
20 to the record, there is no section 1.1, and appendices are not attached. It is 
impossible to evaluate Plaintiffs' argument without being able to identify 
Plaintiffs' sources. The Bureau of Reclamation's Record of Decision states that 
the goal of the Recovery Program is "to recover the listed species of the Upper 
Colorado River to the point of de-listing, while allowing for the continued 
operation and development of the water resources of the Upper Colorado River 
Basin." Ex. 20 at 5. This dual purpose to allow for future development while 
recovering the endangered fish is at odds with Plaintiffs' unsupported view that 
water releases from Flaming Gorge cannot be diverted for use. 
Second, Plaintiffs' assertions that "minimum" flows must remain in the river 
as mandated by the ESA are equally unsupported. The 2006 Record of Decision 
adopts a regime of Flaming Gorge flow releases "patterned so that the peak flows, 
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durations, and base flows and temperatures, described ... would be achieved to 
1./iP the extent possible." Ex. 20 at 3. Operating Flaming Gorge Dam to reach the 
flows "to the extent possible" is a far cry from Plaintiffs' claim that "no releases 
from the reservoir are authorized during periods of low flow except for flows 
designated as minimum instream flows under the Endangered Species Act." Aplt. 
Brief at 21. Except for a general citation to the whole of the ESA, Aplt. Brief at 
24, Plaintiffs cite to no section of the ESA that mandates absolute minimum flows 
for the Green River, and the State Engineer knows of none. 
Third, Plaintiffs' assertions that the Flaming Gorge Reservoir controls 
Green River flows ignores that the Green River and its tributaries form an 
interconnected system of which the reservoir is only a part. Basic hydrologic 
principles establish that the further away a diversion is from the Flaming Gorge 
v/J Dam, the less dam releases influence the river's flow. Ex. 20 at 3. Many 
tributaries enter the Green River below the Flaming Gorge Reservoir. As the 
Bureau of Reclamation describes the three north-to-south geographical sections of 
the Green River in its Record of Decision, "Reach 1 .... is almost entirely 
regulated by releases from Flaming Gorge Dam ..... In [Reach 2] flows from the 
Yampa River combine with releases from Flaming Gorge Dam to provide a less 
regulated flow regime than in Reach 1." Ex. 20 at 3. However, "[i]n [Reach 3, 
where applicants seek to locate their water rights,] the Green River is further 
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influenced by tributary flows from the White, Duchesne, Price, and San Rafael 
Rivers." Id. at 3. The Green River system, with its many tributaries, is a large 
watershed that spans southwest parts of Wyoming, northwest parts of Colorado, 
and a large part of eastern Utah before joining with the Colorado River. See Ex. 
67. 
Because Plaintiffs fail to form a coherent argument against the trial court's 
findings of fact and conclusions of law on this section 73-3-8 criterion, and fail to 
support it with appropriate record citations, this Court should not disturb the trial 
court's conclusion that there reason to believe there is "unappropriated water" for 
the Change Applications in the proposed source. 
III. THE COURT REASONABLY CONCLUDED THAT THE CHANGE 
APPLICATIONS DO NOT UNREASONABLY AFFECT PUBLIC 
RECREATION AND THE NATURAL STREAM ENVIRONMENT 
The Utah Code outlines the State Engineer's responsibilities for 
investigating applications. In applicable part, the statute says: 
If the state engineer, because of information in the state engineer's 
possession obtained either by the state engineer's own investigation 
or otherwise, has reason to believe than an application to appropriate 
water ... will unreasonably affect public recreation or the natural 
stream environment or will prove detrimental to the public welfare, it 
is the state engineer's duty to withhold approval or rejection of the 
application until the state engineer has investigated the matter. 
Utah Code Ann.§ 73-3-8(b)(i) (West Supp. 2014). 
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Although the statute is somewhat vague concerning what the State Engineer 
\/Ji) does with the findings of his investigation, he nevertheless, as a general rule, 
investigates these issues and examines them thoroughly. Ex. 1 at 13-19; Ex. 5 at 
14-20. As long as he satisfies himself after his own investigation on these issues, 
which he may do as part of the "public welfare" analysis required under section 
73-3-8{l)(a)(iii), he can appropriately rule on an application.5 The statute contains 
no specific requirement that the State Engineer or trial court deny a change 
application if it will "unreasonably affect" public recreation or the natural stream 
environment. Thus, to give meaning to this subsection and to employ the reason-
to-believe standard on an application, those impacts are usually examined as part 
of the public welfare criterion under section 73-3-8(1)(a)(iii). But in this case, the 
trial court took the extra step of analyzing impacts to both "public recreation" and 
the "natural stream environment" as if they were distinct and necessary 
5 Plaintiffs' Brief requests in its conclusion "that the State Engineer fulfill 
his statutory obligations and withhold a decision on the Change Applications until 
the Bureau of Reclamation and other interested parties and agencies have 
completed the ongoing Colorado River study that will ... allow the State Engineer 
to properly act upon full information and a complete record." Aplt. Brief at 52. 
First, this request misses the mark in addressing the remedy to the State Engineer. 
The trial court here approved the applications. Second, the statute requires that 
the State Engineer investigate the matter, not that he have perfect data and 
complete information. All decisions involve weighing how much information is 
enough to render an informed conclusion. Plaintiffs here would impose an 
unreasonable "perfection" standard on the State Engineer which would, especially 
in matters of underground water based on imperfect models, be impossible to 
implement. 
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requirements for the Applications' approval. R. 639-644 (Add. A). The State 
Engineer did so as well.6 Both concluded that the Applications would not 
unreasonably affect either interest.7 Ex. 6 at 14-21; Ex. 2 at 13-20; R. 640, 644 
(Add. A). Because the statutory construction of public recreation and the natural 
stream environment are questions of law, this Court owes no deference to the trial 
court's interpretation of the legal rules as independent statutory criteria outside the 
public welfare criterion in section 73-3-8(l)(a)(iii). However, generally, this 
Court should afford the trial court significant discretion on whether the facts it 
finds are within the reach of the statute's meaning. 
The trial court evaluated public recreation on the Green River in light of the 
flows in the Green River at Blue Castle's proposed point of diversion. R. at 
639-640, ,J,r 85-86 (Add. A). The evidence before the trial court showed that for 
99% of the time, Blue Castle's diversion will decrease the river's width by less 
than 1.5 feet and its depth by less than 1.5 inches. R. at 640, ,r 85c-d (Add. A). 
6 The State Engineer explained his investigation on issues of "public 
welfare," "public recreation" and "natural stream environment" under a separate 
( 1 )(b )(i) section of his administrative Order on the Applications to demonstrate he 
had complied with the statute in thoroughly investigating the matters. He reached 
conclusions on each of these issues as well, anticipating disagreement over the 
statutory requirements. Ex. 6 at 14-21; Ex. 2 at 13-20 
7 All diversions have some impact on streams. Such impact is accepted as 
part of the price for beneficial use of water in Utah's arid environment. The 
question, then, is whether the impact to the natural stream environment is 
"unreasonable." 
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The court found this evidence sufficient reason to believe the reductions would not 
vd unreasonably impact rafting, river running, or fishing. R. at 640. 
As Plaintiffs point out, present in the "natural stream environment" of the 
~ Green River are four endangered fish species, protected from harm, or a "taking," 
by the BSA. 16 U.S.C. § 1532 (19) (2012); 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (a)(l)(B) (2012); see 
also Ex. 20 at 1. In a proactive attempt to recover and eventually delist the 
endangered fish, Utah has participated in the Upper Colorado River Endangered 
Fish Recovery Program ("Recovery Program"). 16 U.S.C. § 1535(c) (2012) 
(regarding ESA cooperative agreements with states). This cooperative effort by 
states, federal agencies, environmental groups, and others provides the reasonable 
and prudent alternative required under the ESA to prevent a finding of a taking 
when water is used in the Upper Basin. That program allows water use to 
~ continue.8 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(3)(a) (2012) (ie. section 7 consultation); Ex. 20 at 
5. 
8 As part of that effort, the Bureau of Reclamation, in a February 6, 2006 
Record of Decision, adopted the Action Alternative to operate Flaming Gorge 
Dam to aid in fish recovery efforts. Ex. 20 at 1, 4. If all goes well and these 
coordinated efforts succeed, the fish will no longer be endangered. At that time, 
the fish species will be outside the special protections of the ESA, with their 
management still regulated under state law. In the meantime, the river's regular 
flows, including those from tributaries, supply many water users with the 
opportunity to make beneficial use of river water for which they hold appropriated 
water rights. And these water appropriators, as mandated by Utah law, "shall have 
priority among themselves according to the dates of their respective 
appropriations[.]" Utah Code Ann.§ 73-3-21.1(2)(a) (West Supp. 2014). 
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In short, under the ESA, Utah's participation in the Recovery Program 
allows the state to continue to use its water rights while complying with the ESA's ~ 
protections for the endangered fish. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(3)(a) (2012) (ie. section 7 
consultation). Further, any water use for a power plant will require federal 
licensing. The plant licensing process requires federal authority consultation 
examining the impact water use will have to the endangered species. Plaintiffs 
have failed to identify the authority under which they assert claims against the 
Districts or State Engineer for ESA violations. This defect is especially troubling 
in the absence of federal disapproval of the Applications. 
The trial court fully examined public recreation and the natural stream 
environment as separate components along with the section 73-3-8(1)(a)(iii) 
requirement that the change "not prove detrimental to the public welfare." R. 
639-648 (Add. A). Based on these complex evaluations, the court appropriately 
concluded the Applications do not harm the public welfare or cause BSA-related 
concerns. R. at 640, 644, 645-648 (Add. A). This Court should affirm that 
finding under the deference provided by the Searle and Baby B. standards of 
review. 
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IV. THE TRIAL COURT REASONABLY CONCLUDED THAT THE 
APPLICATIONS MEET ALL REMAINING REQUIREMENTS FOR 
v/jj SECTION 73-3-8, INCLUDING THE APPLICANTS' FINANCIAL 
ABILITY TO COMPLETE THE PROPOSED WORKS 
In their third issue for review-contesting the trial court's conclusion that 
the applicants have the financial ability to complete the proposed 
works-Plaintiffs fail to confine themselves to the issue they have articulated. 
Therefore, in an abundance of caution, the State Engineer reviews the remaining 
statutory criteria Plaintiffs touch on from section 73-3-8 with an eye to the reason-
·.;J) to-believe standard the trial court appropriately employed. Where the Plaintiffs 
provide only weak evidence, if any, for their arguments, this Court should afford 
the trial court significant discretion when reviewing the court's determination that 
the Applications meet the applicable statutory criteria. 
Other than a vague reference, Aplt. Brief at 51, Plaintiffs make no claims 
that approving the change applications will impair other water rights. And the 
trial court specifically found that with "conditions designed to mitigate potential 
impairment," R. 628 ,r 42 (Add. A), "there is reason to believe that the 
Applications will not impair existing rights." R. 629 (Add. A). The trial court 
found that the Applications would not impair the few downstream water rights that 
require only 37.2 cubic feet per second flow rate, R. at 628 ,r,r 39--40 (Add. A), 
and no water users testified about impairment, R. at 628 ,r 41 (Add. A). Plaintiffs 
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make no serious attack based on this criterion. This Court should afford the trial 
court significant discretion in applying the law to the facts of this matter and 
respect the trial court's conclusion as being in line with the Searle and Baby B. 
standards of review. 
Physical and economic feasibility are usually fact-intensive. For example, a 
hypothetical plateau irrigation project, where water must be raised 300 feet above 
a river bed, may be both or either physically or economically infeasible. Perhaps 
no equipment exists to raise the amount of water needed to the top of the plateau, 
thus rendering the project physically infeasible. Or perhaps the pumping can be 
accomplished with very expensive available equipment, but the cost of electricity 
to run the pumps will be twice the value of each year's farm crops-making such a 
project economically infeasible. Physical and economic feasibility rest on whether 
the water project or use can actually be achieved, a conclusion that should be 
afforded increased deference because it is based on a variety of trial court-
determined facts. 
In the instant matter, the trial court considered the physical site for Blue 
Castle's power plant and examined the physical and economic feasibility of the 
nuclear power plant project. R. 630-632, 632-636 (Add. A). For the plant's 
physical feasibility, the trial court determined that the proposed site, located near 
necessary rail transportation, highways, and electrical transmission lines, R. 630 ,I 
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47 (Add. A), along with ongoing testing and Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
oversight to evaluate the site's suitability, R. 630 ,I 48-52 (Add. A), was sufficient 
to declare the project physically feasible. R. 631-632 (Add. A). Feasible is 
defined as "[c]apable of being done, executed, affected or accomplished." Black's 
Law Dictionary 609 ( 6th ed. 1990). As the trial court concluded, again employing 
the reason-to-believe standard articulated in Searle, the proposed Blue Castle 
project is physically feasible-perhaps it is risky, perhaps it could fail, but there is 
reasonable assurance, based on the evidence, of water for use in Blue Castle's 
power plant. Under the Baby B. factors, 2012 UT 35 at ,I 42, this Court should 
give significant discretion to the trial court's findings of fact on this matter and 
whether those facts come within the reach of the statutory criterion. 
The trial court also reasonably concluded that the project meets the criterion 
for economic feasibility. The trial court found that Utah's place as third nationally 
for population growth (growing 23.8% between 2000 and 2010) will increase 
demands for electrical power in the State. R. 632 ,I 53, 55 (Add. A). The trial 
court made several findings of fact regarding energy supply and demand for both 
Utah and the nation. R. 632 ,I,r 55a-f, 56-60 (Add. A). In light of these findings, 
the court ultimately concluded that the likely increase in future demand for 
electricity makes the project economically feasible. R. 634-636 (Add. A). Again, 
the project may be potentially risky, but it is doable with the economics on the side 
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of the need for future power plants. See Bullock v. Hanks, 452 P .2d 866, 867 
(Utah 1969) ("[T]he cost of [ enlarging a ditch] would not be prohibitive and 
render the proposed plan economically unfeasible."). Under the Searle standard, 
the trial court's determination that there is reason to believe the venture may 
succeed should be afforded significant discretion because it is based on relatively 
complex facts involving the power industry. The trial court's conclusion that the 
facts fulfill the statutory requirement for economic feasibility is reasonable and 
Plaintiffs have failed to show otherwise. 
Financial ability to complete proposed works is also a fact-dependent 
approval criterion. The trial court's findings of fact on this matter, along with 
witness demeanor and testimony on Blue Castle's finances, should therefore be 
given significant discretion. However, as a preliminary question that is more a 
question of law than of fact, the financial ability to complete proposed works does ~ 
not depend on a farmer, business entity, or homeowner, for example, having cash 
on hand to complete an entire project at the time they apply for water use. 
Financing is available for a potential homeowner who seeks to build a home and 
needs a water right for domestic water use. The home buyer may have on hand 
only enough cash for a down payment that will allow her to obtain financing to 
build a house, but she is nevertheless considered to have the financial ability to 
complete the proposed project. Financial calculations for a nuclear power plant 
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are much more complex and lengthy, particularly with the drawn-out permitting 
vl) process. Still, the trial court believed Blue Castle had demonstrated its financial 
ability, in part by raising and spending $17.5 million to obtain funding and capital 
needed for each phase of the nuclear plant permitting process. R. 636 ,I 74b (Add. 
A); R. 668 at 14:17-15:4. The trial court, echoing the State Engineer's finding, 
said: 
Blue Castle has demonstrated an ability to secure funding and 
capital as needed, on a step-by-step basis to capitalize the Project and 
has a plan to continue capitalizing the Project. Accordingly, the 
Court finds that there exists reason to believe that Blue Castle has the 
financial ability to complete the Project. 
R. 637-638 (Add. A). 
This finding reflects in part how the relatively low reason-to-believe 
standard relates to the financial facts. The trial court, like the State Engineer, 
v0 correctly determined there is reason to believe the applicants have the financial 
ability to complete the proposed works commensurate with the application's 
-.:a current status in the application process. Plaintiffs have failed to show any 
affirmative evidence that Blue Castle lacks this financial ability. Where Blue 
Castle's evidence met its burden as an applicant, Plaintiffs' vague references to 
"paucity of information," Aplt. Brief at 45, cannot carry the day. This Court 
should afford the trial court significant discretion in applying the legal rule to the 
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facts of this case and affirm the trial court's determination under the Searle 
standard. 
Good faith, as well as the intentions of the applicants as to speculation and 
monopoly, rely, at least in part, on witness demeanor and the facts found at trial. 
In keeping with the Supreme Court's Baby B. analysis, increased deference should 
be given the trial court in determining whether the Applications meet these 
criteria. 2012 UT 35, ,r 42 (for mixed questions of law and fact, "the degree to 
which a trial court's application of the legal rule relies on facts observed by the 
trial judge," is a factor in determining the degree of deference to afford the trial 
court). 
Speculation "means holding the water itself for the purposes of 
speculation." R. 638, 639 (Add. A). As the trial court found, there is "no reason 
to believe" the applicants intend only to monopolize the water, R. 638 ,r 79 (Add. 
A). In their brief, Plaintiffs incorrectly focus on the relative likelihood of an 
admittedly ambitious project's completion-whether the project is likely to 
actually beneficially use the underlying water rights. Aplt. Brief at 34-3 7. In 
doing so, they misinterpret and misapply Butler, Crockett & Walsh Development 
Corp. v. Pinecrest Pipeline Operating Co. (Pinecrest Pipeline), 2004 UT 67, 98 
P.3d 1, as support for their view that beneficial use by the project's future 
operators cannot be attributed to the current applicants. Aplt. Brief at 34-35. 
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Pinecrest Pipeline stands for a far more straightforward proposition-that one 
vii water user user cannot claim as their own the beneficial use of other water users. 
In Pinecrest Pipeline, a Mr. Meyer, one of twenty-seven water users on a system, 
claimed as his own water right all of the right that served several houses in a small 
canyon. The plaintiff development company claimed title to the water right 
through Meyer, and thus control of the water supply for the other users. The 
Supreme Court, on that point, articulated the following rule: 
[T]he doctrines of appropriation and beneficial use do not support 
Meyer's claim that he is individually entitled to [the Water User's 
Claim] WUC 57-8492. A water user's appropriations are limited to 
the amount the user puts to beneficial use. Beneficial use is "the 
basis, the measure, and the limit of all rights to the use of water in this 
state." Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-3 (2003). 
Pinecrest Pipeline, 2004 UT 67 at ~ 24 (internal citations omitted). 
The Court held that Meyer could not claim the beneficial use of other users. 
Plaintiffs erroneously attempt to use this same reasoning to assert that Blue Castle 
may not claim the future power plant owner's beneficial use as its own. Aplt. 
Brief at 33-34. In doing so they misapply the reasoning of Pinecrest Pipeline to 
these distinguishable facts. Blue Castle's potential sale of a power plant permit, 
with necessary water rights, is more akin to a land developer who acquires house 
building permits, land, and water rights to subdivide and develop land for 
homeowners. If no municipal water is available, the land developer, who uses 
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none of the domestic water necessary for occupying the houses, is not speculating 
in water by selling a domestic water right as part of a residence. Such water rights ~ 
are a necessary part of a house purchase, and are not "speculative" merely because 
the developer does not personally use the water rights. 
Likewise, Plaintiffs' citation to Western Water v. Olds, 2008 UT 18, 184 
P.3d 578, is inapposite and distinguishable from the facts here. There, Western 
Water applied to the State Engineer for whatever water was available in the Salt 
Lake and Utah Valley watersheds. When the State Engineer denied that 
application, the applicants requested that he reconsider essentially to, in the 
Court's words, "root around for unappropriated water and then award that water to 
Western Water." Id. ~ 26. The original State Engineer's administrative order 
denying Western Water's application found that the application met none of the 
section 73-3-8 criteria. The Western Water Court said, "[T]he State Engineer 
concluded that the Original Application was filed for speculation or monopoly 
because the only proposed beneficial use for the water was a plan to sell [the 
water] to others. Indeed, the applicants had 'no lands, facilities, customers, or 
contracts."' Id. ~ 8; R. 639 (Add. A). 
Gathering all available water, with no plan for use except sale of the 
resource itself, disregards the bedrock statutory requirement that water may be 
appropriated only for a beneficial use. See Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-3 (West 2004). 
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Attempting acquisition to remove the water from the public's reach-or to acquire 
~ it to sell to those who would beneficially use it-is speculation. But, no facts in 
evidence here demonstrate monopoly or speculation. Applicants demonstrated the 
water is the means to a proposed end-power generation-and not the end itself. 
Power generation is a recognized beneficial use and any future plans or 
preparations that may sell the water as part of a business package for its intended 
use do not render the Change Applications speculative. 
Regarding another approval criterion, the scope of the "public welfare" 
analysis should be confined as a matter of law to those water-related issues the 
State Engineer can appropriately evaluate. The State Engineer is the state's water 
authority. Utah Code Ann.§ 73-2-1(3) (West Supp. 2014). He has no background 
or special training in nuclear regulatory issues. His expertise is in line with the 
vJj) statutory requirement that the use of water should not be contrary to the public's 
expectations to have water used in furtherance of a particular public good-in this 
..;; case, the production of energy. That is not to say he has no responsibility to 
examine all issues as thoroughly as a particular application may require, but he 
cannot be expected to opine on whether the proposed nuclear power plant is a 
"good idea" in light of the controversies that surround nuclear power as a long-
term energy source. Further, no record evidence supports Plaintiffs' assertion that 
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during normal operation, any completed power plant would command use of the 
river to the detriment of other upstream users. Aplt. Brief at 22-23, 51. 
In light of all evidence before the trial court, including witness demeanor 
and factors not readily ascertainable from review of the record, this Court should 
affirm the trial court's conclusion that there was reason to believe, under the 
Searle standard, that approving the Change Applications "would not prove 
detrimental to the public welfare." Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-8(1)(a)(iii) (West 
Supp. 2014). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State Engineer respectfully requests the Court 
to affirm the district court's interpretation and application of section 73-3-8 as 
supported by the facts that fall within the statute's ambit. 
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT 
Because the procedural posture of this case includes the State Engineer as a 
statutory defendant at the trial below, and because oral argument would help the 
Court understand the questions of fact and law particular to water at issue in this 
matter, Defendant State Engineer encourages the Court to hold oral argument for 
this case. 
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STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT OF EMERY COUNTY 
HEAL UT AH, et al. 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
KANE COUNTY WATER 
CONSERVANCY DISTRICT, et al., 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT' CONCLUSIONS OF LA w AND 
JUDGMENT APPROVING CHANGE APPLICATIONS 
a35402 AND a35874 
Civil No. 120700009 
(Consolidated case with Case No. 
120700010) 
Judge George M. Harmond 
This matter was tried to the bench trial on September 23 through 27, 2013, sitting by 
stipulation of the parties at Price, Utah. Plaintiffs were present and represented by John S. 
Flitton and Lara A. Swensen. Defendants Blue Castle Holdings, Kane County Water 
Conservancy District and San Juan County Conservancy District were present and represented 
by David C. Wright and John H. Mabey, Jr. The Utah State Engineer, Kent Jones, was 
represented by Julie I. Valdes. The Com1, having heard testimony, received exhibits, reviewed 
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the trial briefs of the parties, and considered the arguments of counsel, and consistent with its 
Memorandum Decision of November 27, 2013, makes the following findings of fact, 
co~clusions of law and judgment. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Court is asked to approve two change applications, a35402, based on approved 
Water Rights 89-74, 89-1285 and 89-1513 (Kane); and a35874, based on approved Water Right 
09-462 (San Juan) ("Applications") concerning the use of water for a proposed nuclear power 
plant near Green River, Utah. The Applications seek to use 53,600 acre-feet of water per year by 
diverting up to 75 cubic feet per second ("cfs") continually from the Green River. Previously, the 
water rights were approved for use in steam power generation at coal fired power plants. That 
same use-electric power generation-is requested here. 
Pursuant to his statutory duties concerning the administration of Utah's water, Utah Code 
Ann. §73-2-1(3)(a)("The state engineer shall be responsible for the general administrative 
supervision of the waters of the state and the measurement, appropriation, apportionment and 
distribution of those waters."), the Utah State Engineer, Kent Jones, approved the Applications in 
2012. The plaintiffs, HEAL Utah and others, protested the Applications and now challenge that 
approval, requiring this court to apply the same statutory criteria in a de novo analysis pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. §73-3-14. Kane and San Juan County Water Conservancy Districts and Blue 
Castle Holdings are referred to together as the Applicants. 
GENERAL FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Blue Castle Holdings ("Blue Castle") proposes to build a multi-unit nuclear powered 
electrical generating plant near Green River, Emery County, Utah. 
2 
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2. In preparation for obtaining federal licensing of the plant, Blue Castle has secured water 
and some of the real property necessary for the operation of the proposed pant. 
3. Transition Power Development, LLC, Blue Castle's predecessor in interest, leased from 
the Kane County Water Conservancy District ("Kane") Water Right Nos. 89-74, 89-1285 
and 89-1513, representing 29,600 acre-feet of water, the original diversion point of which 
was from Lake Powell and Wahweap Creek in Southern Utah. 
4. The Kane water right was filed on January 15, 1964, by another party for the 
development of a coal-powered power plant near Lake Powell, with the water being 
diverted from Lake Powell/Colorado River. 
5. The Kane water right was approved on September 3, 1965, but was subordinated to the 
Central Utah Project water rights and several other applications in the Uinta Basin and 
the Duchesne River. 
6. Over the years the Kane water right was transferred several times and, on November 24, 
2003, it was transferred to Kane. 
7. Transition Power also leased from the San Juan Water Conservancy District ("San Juan") 
Water Right No. 09-462, representing 24,000 acre-feet of water, with the point of 
diversion located on the San Juan River in San Juan County, Utah. 
8. The San Juan water right at issue is a segregated portion of a water right originally filed 
on October 14, 1965. The water right was segregated and approved in 1967 for a coal-
fired power plant near Mexican Hat, Utah. 
9. The priority date for the San Juan water rights is April 21, 2000, as a result of an 
application for reinstatement after the first approved application lapsed. 
10. The water represented by both of these leases has previously been approved for use in the 
operation of steam power generation at coal-fired power plants in Kane and San Juan 
counties, but because those projects are no longer viable, the Districts have leased the 
water rights to Blue Castle. 
11. The Districts filed change applications a35402 and a35874 (the "Applications") to 
change the points of diversion of the water to the Green River located near Green River, 
Utah. The proposed place of use of the water is at the site of the proposed nuclear plant 
in Emery County, located approximately 4.5 miles west of the Green River. 
12. The change application for Kane was filed with the State Engineer on March 30, 2009, 
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and foi- San Juan on August 27, 2009. The Applications were supported by Blue Castle, 
which as the project developer, provided evidence in support of the Applications. 
13. Blue Castle asserts that the nuclear power plant ("the Project") would consume and 
deplete the entire 53,600 acre-feet of water represented by the Applications, drawing a 
maximum of 75 cfs continuously from the Green River, primarily for use in creating 
steam to generate power and for cooling the plant. 
14. The Applications also seek approval to store 2,000 acre-feet of water in a reservoir 
located on the Project site. 
15. The state engineer, Kent Jones, ("State Engineee') held an adminish·ative hearing on the 
Applications on January 12, 2010, and thereafter conducted extensive investigation. 
16. In a decision dated January 20, 2012, the State Engineer approved the Applications to 
change the points of diversion and allowed diversion and depletion of 53,600 acre-feet 
and a diversion rate of up to 75 cfs. On February 28, 2012, the State Engineer denied a 
Request for Reconsideration filed by certain protestants on February 9, 2012. 
17. The Plaintiffs filed two actions on March 27, 2012, challenging the Applications in two 
separate complaints. The actions were consolidated on May 16, 2012. 
18. The court notes that the Project, if constructed, would be Utah's first nuclear power plant. 
19. Blue Castle is developing the Project pursuant to 10 C.F.R. Part 52. The Project is 
phased, and if it proceeds, the Project will require an environmental impact assessment 
prior to the submission of an application for an Early Site Permit to the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, and then a full environmental impact statement prior to the 
approval of the Early Site Permit. In order to construct and operate the Project, Blue 
Castle would need a combined operating license from the NRC. 
20. Plaintiffs make the argument that the State Engineer has ceded a final decision on Utah 
water rights to federal agencies. But regardless of what is determined here, if the 
environmental impacts cannot be resolved, the Project will not be able to use the water 
rights. 
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS CONCERNING THE STATUTORY CRITERIA 
4 
.617 
April 21, 2014 04:28 PM 4 of37 
( ( 
1. Legal Standards 
In Utah, water belongs to the public and potential users must apply to the State Engineer 
for authority to withdraw water from a natural source. Utah Code §73-1-1(1)-(2). To authorize 
the use of water, whether it be a new application to appropriate or a change to an approved 
applications' point of diversion, place of use, or purpose of use, the State Engineer must apply 
the criteria mandated by statute. §73-3-8. See Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 500 (Utah 
1989). 
All State Engineer administrative actions, unless designated otherwise, are informal 
proceedings. Utah Admin. Code R655-6-2. 
The legislature created the office of the State Engineer 'to keep records of 
all established water rights and those to be acquired in the future, to 
supervise the distribution of the water, and to keep records of and regulate 
future appropriations and changes in the place of diversion, use and nature 
of the use.' United States v. District Court, Utah, 238 P.2d 1132, I 134 
(Utah 1951 ); see also Utah Code Ann. §73-2-1 (1989 & Supp. 2002) 
(identifying responsibilities of the State Engineer). Due to the scarcity of 
water resources in our state, appropriation of water is tightly controlled 
and the State Engineer oversees each step in the application and 
appropriation process. 
Green River Canal Co. v. Thayn, 2003 UT 50, ,I28, 84 P. 3d 1134. 
"A person aggrieved by an order of the state engineer', has the ability to obtain judicial 
review under the water statutes and the Utah Administrative Procedures Act. Utah Code Ann. 
§73-3-14 (1). The petitioner requesting judicial review is required to name the state engineer as 
respondent. §73-3-14(3)(a). Pursuant to Utah Code §63G-4-402 (l)(a), this Court has 
jurisdiction "to review by trial de novo all final agency actions resulting from informal 
adjudicative proceedings." The court, "without a jury, shall determine all questions of fact and 
5 
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law." §63G-4-402(3)(a). 
The court's review by trial de novo "means a new trial with no deference to the 
administrative proceedings below." Archer v. Bd Of State Lands & Forestry, 907 P.2d 1142, 
1145 (Utah 1995). The issues before the court in its plenary review are, "however, strictly 
limited to those which were, or could have been, raised before the State Engineer." Crafts v. 
Hansen, 667 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1983); Searle v. Milburn Irr. Co., 2006 UT 16, 134, 133 
P .3d 382. The Supreme Court of Utah stated in Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 922 P .2d 745, 
751 (Utah 1996), that: 
Although it may be inappropriate to impose the same level of strict waiver 
analysis that we have applied to issues or objections not raised before a 
trial court, the failure to make known the nature of one's rights in the 
course of an administrative proceeding clearly disentitles a party from 
raising its claim for the first time before a district court on de novo review. 
( citation omitted). 
"[T]he decision of the court on review, except for the formalities of the trial and 
judgment is of the same nature and for the same purpose [as that of the State Engineer.]" Searle, 
2006 UT 16, 134. Accordingly, under §73-3-S(l)(a), it is the duty of the court to approve 
applications for permanent changes in the point of diversion, the place of use, 'or the purpose of 
use for which the water was originally appropriated, if the court has reason to believe that: 
There is unappropriated water in the proposed source; 
The proposed use will not impair existing rights or interfere with the more 
beneficial use of the water; 
The proposed plan is physically and economically feasible ... and would not 
prove detrimental to the public welfare; 
The applicant has the financial ability to complete the proposed works; and 
6 
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The application was filed in good faith and not for purposes of speculation 
or monopoly. 
The court is required to reject the application if it fails to meet the requirements of Utah 
Code Ann. §73-3-S(l)(b). 
Searle describes the procedure as "placing a fairly low burden on a party seeking 
approval of a change application," but that it "must provide some meaningful barrier so that the 
floodgates remain closed to all applications except those with a sufficient probability of 
successful perfection." 2006 UT 16, if45, quoting Salt Lake CUy v. Boundary Springs Water 
Users Ass'n., 270 P.2d 453, 455 (Utah 1954). Accordingly, Searle stated that it "must be clear 
that the decision maker's determination that there is reason to believe is grounded in evidence 
sufficient to make the belief reasonable." Id. 146. "[P]roducing evidence sufficient to block 
approval of a change application is no doubt a difficult task for a protestant, illustrating 
impairment by means not reliant on conjecture or probability would, in many cases, be an 
impossible task." Id ,rss . 
Although under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act the court may grant certain 
relief, see §63G-4-404(b ), in cases involving the de novo review of an order of the State 
Engineer, the court is limited to "authorizing or denying the applicant the right to proceed with 
his plan to appropriate the water the same as though it were made by the Engineer without an 
appeal." Bullock v. Tracy, 294 P.2d 707, 709 (Utah 1956). The court simply "determines 
whether the application should be approved or rejected and does not fix the rights of the parties 
beyond the determination of the matter." Eardley v. Terry, 17 P.2d 362, 365 (Utah 1938). The 
court may also, if it approves the change applications, impose conditions on the use of the water. 
7 
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When an application is approved, the applicant is permitted a certain period of time 
within which to develop the proposed diversion and use of water. §73-3-12. If the water is not 
applied to beneficial use within the statutory timelines, the applicant's water right lapses unless 
an extension is granted. Id. A change of an approved application does not affect the priority of 
the original application or extend the time period within which the construction of work is to 
begin or be completed. §73-3-3(8)(b). In times of water shortage, water rights in Utah are 
regulated according to the prior appropriation doctrine and "the one first in time is first in 
rights." §73-3-1(5). 
The State Engineer has no authority to finally adjudicate water rights, but "only find that 
there is reason to believe that the application may be granted and some water beneficially used 
thereunder without interfering with the rights of others." U.S. v. Dist. Court, 238 P.2d 1132, 
1137 (Utah 1951). An applicant can only proceed absent "injury to [prior] rights if he hopes to 
perfect a right ... Legally, no one can be hurt by the procedure established by the Legislature. At 
the same time, however, it permits the development of our water resources to the utmost." 
Eardley, 17 P.2d at 366. 
As stipulated by the parties and noted in the Scheduling Order and Trial Setting signed by 
the court on August 15, 2013, the Districts "have the burden of proof throughout the proceeding 
on the applications." 
2. Analysis 
The Court finds that Blue Castle and the Districts presented evidence sufficient to 
establish that there is reason to believe that each of the statutory criteria have been met regarding 
the applications. The Court has looked to the plain language of the statute and given effect to the 
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language. See Salt Lake City. v. Holliday Water Co., 2010 UT 45, 127, 234 P.3d ll05. The 
Court's "primary goal is to evince the tme intent and purpose of the Legislature." State v. 
Martinez, 2002 UT 80, 18, 52 P.3d 1276 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
There is unappropriated water in the proposed source. 
The Court first looks at the appropriations on a system-wide basis. Like the State 
Engineer, the Court considers all water tributary to the Colorado River Basin to be 
hydrologically connected. Second, the court looks at water availability in the Green River at the 
proposed point of diversion. 
Plaintiffs argue that the State Engineer's statement that the Upper Colorado River Basin, 
which includes the Green River, is "over-appropriated on paper," establishes that there cannot be 
unappropriated water in the proposed source. 
Findings: 
21. The use of the Green River's water is regulated by the Colorado River Compact of 1922 
and the Upper Colorado River Basin Compact of 1948. Utah Code§ 73-12a-l et seq. and 
§73-13-1 et seq. 
22. Under the Colorado River Compact of 1922, Article III, ("Compact''), the Upper Basin 
states (i.e., Utah, Colorado, Wyoming, New Mexico) are required not to deplete the flow 
of the Colorado River using water rights perfected after the 1922 Compact was signed 
unless the Upper Basin provides to the Lower Basin 75 million acre-feet of water in any 
continuous ten year period, as apportioned at Lee Ferry, Arizona, which equates to 7.5 
million acre-feet per year on average. In addition, up to 750 thousand acre-feet per year 
must be delivered to Mexico.1 
23. Since 1896, the Upper Basin states have always delivered the required water to the Lower 
Basin and Mexico. 
I The relationship between "Lee Ferry" and "Lees Ferry" may cause confusion. The Compact 
identifies "Lee Ferry" as the division between the Upper and Lower Basin. One of the gauges 
used to measure the flow, however, called the "Lees Ferry Gauge," is now located about one 
mile upstream from "Lee Ferry." 
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24. Under the Upper Compact, after subtracting 50,000 acre-feet for Arizona, the State of 
Utah is apportioned 23 percent of the remaining water of the Basin, which is calculated at 
approximately 1.4 million acre-feet per year. 
25. To date, it is estimated by the State Engineer and Jerry Olds, former State Engineer, that 
Utah has developed and uses approximately 1 million acre-feet per year of its Colorado 
River allocation, leaving approximately 400,000 acre-feet (estimates are between 360,000 
and 400,000 acre-feet) per year currently unappropriated. There is a difference between 
water for which an application to appropriate has been made and approved and 
appropriated water, that is water actually put to beneficial use. Water can be approved 
for use under an application but that does not mean that the water is appropriated, that is, 
beneficially used. 
26. The Kane and San Juan water rights at issue here are among the many approved but 
undeveloped applications on the Colorado River drainage in Utah. 
27. At the present time, there are at least 574,600 acre-feet of approved yet undeveloped 
water in the Upper Colorado River Basin in Utah for which the State Engineer has 
previously approved appropriation applications, but which remains unappropriated, 
including the Kane and San Juan Applications and also including Navajo and Ute Tribe 
reserved water rights, leaving approximately 400,000 acre-feet of Colorado River Basin 
water unappropriated. 
28. Most of this 574,600 acre-feet of water has not been applied to beneficial use, and it is 
unappropriated water available for use by those with approved applications at least up to 
the limit of Utah's Colorado River allocation. If all of the water represented by the 
approved applications for appropriation were actually appropriated, that is, put to 
beneficial use, then Utah's allocation would in fact be over-appropriated. 
29. At this point, however, the 574,600 acre-feet of water has not been put to, or applied to, 
some useful industry or to a beneficial purpose. Under Utah law, the Upper Basin in 
Utah is not, in fact, over appropriated. 
30. The United States Bureau of Reclamation estimates that even under a rapid growth 
scenario, by the year 2060, Utah will only have developed 1.38 million acre-feet of the 
1.4 million acre-feet allotted to it under the Upper Compact. In addition, the underlying 
water rights associated with the Kane and San Juan Applications are approved for 
IO 
623 
April 21 1 2014 04:28 PM 10 of 37 
(-
appropriation and have been accounted for in the approved, but undeveloped Utah water 
of the Upper Basin. 
31. The Green River has an average volume of 3.9 million acre-feet per year, as measured 
from 1977 to 2007. For an average water year, the base flow ranges between 1,800 and 
3,000 cfs. The undisputed evidence is further that the annual mean flow of the Green 
River, measured at the USGS station at Green River, Utah, for more than a century is 
6,048 cfs, with an annual mean volume of 4,381,000 acre-feet. 
32. The flows fluctuate according to the time of year, being higher during spring runoff and 
times of precipitation, and lower during dry summer months and colder months when the 
river ices up in areas. 
33. Based on historic flows at the Green River station, there has always been sufficient water 
at the Green River USGS station to accommodate the amount of the diversion requested 
in the Applications. 
34. There are approximately 139 approved water rights (excluding stock watering rights) on 
the Green River with points of diversion located between its confluence with the Price 
River and confluence with the Colorado River, which water rights are approved to divert 
125,000 acre-feet of water and deplete 56,500 acre~feet. 
35. If all the existing approved rights were in use, the total depletion from the Green River 
would be approximately 1.29% of the average volume measured at the Green River 
station. 
36. Most of these depletions occur above the Green River station. At this time, there remains 
in Utah approximately 369,000 acre-feet of water in the Colorado River basin available 
for development and to be applied to beneficial use. 
37. It has never been necessary to regulate the Green River by priority because there have 
always existed adequate flows in the Green River to accommodate the existing 
appropriations. 
38. The additional depletion of water from the Green River to support the Project would be 
1.22% of the annual mean volume of the River, based on the data from the Green Giver 
station gauge. 
11 
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a. This would result in a maximum expected decrease in the depth of the Green 
River of less than one and one half inches, and an average decrease in width of 
the Green River of approximately one foot, at the point of the Green River USGS 
gaging station. 
b. The average width of the Green is approximately three hundred and fifty feet. 
c. Plaintiffs admit three facts on this point: 
i.That the "underlying water right(s] associated with the [Applications] 
[are] approved appropriation[s] that [have] not yet been developed.'' 
(Defense Ex. 47 at 3-4). 
ii.That "[a]pproval of [the Applications] do[es] not constitute a new 
appropriation of water within the Colorado River Basin .... " Id. 
iii.They are instead "new diversion[s] from the Green River, "which is part 
of that Basin." Id. 
Conclusions of Law Concerning Unappropriated Water. 
When the State Engineer approves a change application, the applicant acquires only the 
right to develop the use of the water; the approved application is not an actual use of water. 
Accordingly, under Utah law, an approved change application, such as the Applications here, is 
not itself the actual use of water. 
April 21, 2014 04:28 PM 
The three principal elements to constitute a valid appropriation of water, 
and, as stated by the comt in the case of Low v. Rizor, 25 Or. 557, 37 Pac. 
82, and approved by the same court in the case of the Nevada Ditch Co. v. 
Bennett, 30 Or., 59, 45 Pac. 472, 60 Am. St. Rep. 777, are: (1) An intent to 
apply it to some beneficial use; (2) a diversion from the natural channel by 
means of a ditch, canal, or other structure; and (3) an application of it 
within a reasonable time to some useful industry. 
But we think the filing of a written application with the state engineer, as 
required by the statute, is but declaring, or the giving of a notice of, an 
intention to appropriate unappropriated public water. The final step, and 
12 
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the most essential element, to constitute a completed valid appropriation 
of water, is the application of it to a beneficial purpose. Whatever else is 
required to be or is done, until the actual application of the water is made 
for a beneficial purpose, no valid appropriation has been effected. 
Sowardsv. Meagher, 108P.1112, 1116, 1117 (Utah 1910). 
This Court finds that there is unappropriated water available for the Project in the 
Colorado River Drainage in Utah, and specifically in the Green River. 
The criterion of unappropriated water is found in §73-3-8(1)(a), which governs 
applications to appropriate. The Applications seek to change the points of diversion and place 
and nature of use of water that is already appropriated under approved applications. The 
statutory criteria for change application approval is §73-3-3. Since Bonham, 788 P.2d at 500, 
however, §73-3-8's criteria applies to change applications. 
The question of unappropriated water is directly relevant when considering an application 
to app1·opriate. But when evaluating a change application, which by definition involves a prior, 
approved application to appropriate, the issue of unappropriated water cannot be applied in 
exactly the same way. The water involved in a change application is already approved for use. 
The change applicant seeks to change an already approved use, either in terms of "point of 
diversion, place of use, or purpose of use." §73-3-3(1)(a). 
The Applications concern water already approved for appropriation within the Colorado 
River drainage in Utah, but not yet appropriated, or actually applied to the approved use. As 
explained by the State Engineer in the orders approving the Applications, the underlying water 
rights associated with the Applications are approved appropriations that have not yet been 
effected, i.e., developed to an actual beneficial use. 
13 
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Ultimately, a water user's appropriation is limited to the amount put to beneficial use. 
"No one can acquire the right to use more water than is necessary, with reasonable efficiency, to 
satisfy his beneficial requirements." McNaughton v. Eaton, 242 P.2d 570, 572 (Utah 1952). This 
is true "regardless of the quantity [of water] that has been used for (past] purposes and the length 
oftime it may have been used." Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Shurtliff, 164 P. 856, 859 
(Utah 1916). Because "[t]he right to use water in Utah has always depended upon its application 
to beneficial use," Daniels Irr. Co. v. Daniel Summit Co., 571 P.2d 1323, 1324 (Utah 1977); a 
user is "limited to the amount of water ... applied to a beneficial use, and not to an amount they 
could have claimed or require." Salt Lake City v. Gardner, 114 P. 147, 150 (Utah 1911). See 
also Utah Code Ann. §73-1-3 (1989) ("Beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure and the 
limit of all rights to the use of water in this state"). 
Approval of the Applications does not constitute a new appropriation of water within the 
Colorado River Basin. The Applications are instead new diversions from the Green River, which 
is part of that Basin. The water associated with the Applications is part of Utah's allocation 
under the Colorado River Compact. Rather than divert water from Lake Powell and the San Juan 
River, as previously authorized, the Applications propose to divert from another point still within 
the Colorado River drainage. Ther~fore, approval does not constitute a new appropriation. 
Rather, approval permits the use of already approved water, but at a different place and for 
electricity generation from nuclear power rather than coal. 
Accordingly, determining whether there is unappropriated water in the proposed source 
under §73-3-8, required an examination of water availability at the proposed new point of 
diversion-the Green River. 
14 
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The Court concludes that there is adequate unappropriated water in the Upper Colorado 
River drainage and the Green River in Utah to support the Applications. 
The proposed use will not impair existing rights. 
Findings of Fact: 
39. The majority of the points of diversion of existing water rights users with senior priority 
rights on the Green River are located above Blue Castle's proposed point of diversion and 
will therefore not be impaired by the Project's diversion. 
40. Aside from stockwatering rights, only 16 water rights divert downstream from the Project 
to the confluence with the Colorado River. Those downstream water rights require 37.2 
cfs and will not be impaired by the Applications because there is sufficient flow in the 
Green River to satisfy both the downstream rights and the Applications. 
41. There was no testimony by persons opposing the applications or any water rights owners 
that any of their vested rights would be substantially impaired as a result of the proposed 
change. The Couit did not receive any evidence that the Project would interfere with or 
impair the rights of any vested water right holders on the Green River or the Colorado 
River. As a result, the change applications cannot be rejected on this basis. 
42. As the State Engineer did, the Court may also approve an application with conditions 
designed to mitigate potential i_mpairment. Accordingly, the Project shall be subject to all 
prior rights and subordinated to the Central Utah Project. 
Conclusions of Law Concerning Impairment: 
In Searle, quoting Salt Lake City. Boundary Springs Water Users Ass'n., 270 P.2d 453, 
455 (Utah 1954) (footnotes omitted) ( emphasis added), the Utah Supreme Comt stated: 
A change application cannot be rejected without a showing that vested 
rights will thereby be substantially impaired. While the applicant has the 
general burden of showing that no impairment of vested rights will result 
from the change, the person opposing such application must fail if the 
evidence does not disclose that his rights will be impaired. 
Searle, 2006 UT 16, if26. 
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See also Utah Code § 73-3-3(7)(a); 
Except as provided by Section 73-3-30, the state engineer may not reject 
a permanent or temporary change application for the sole reason that the 
change would impair a vested water right. 
The Court concludes that there is reason to believe that the Applications will not impair 
existing rights. 
The Project will not interfere with the more beneficial use of the water. 
Findings of Fact: 
43. The Court received no evidence of a more beneficial use of the water. Power generation, 
under §73-3-8(l)(b) is equally beneficial as irrigation or domestic use. 
44. The Court received no evidence that there exists a proposed use for domestic or culinary 
purposes which the Project will impair. 
45. Further, power generation is an important segment of Utah's economy, supporting 
thousands of jobs and providing electricity at reasonable cost to the public and industry. 
a. From 1985 to 2005, power generation provided more tax revenue to the state than 
any other segment of the economy. 
b. The Governor and Legislature have stated that providing for Utah's growing 
energy needs is a priority. The Governor has challenged power producers in Utah 
to develop generation resources that will allow Utah to meet its projected power 
need and also export 25% of its power production. 
c. According to the Utah Legislature"[i]t is the policy of this state to encourage the 
development of independent and qualifying power production and cogeneration 
facilities, to promote a diverse array of economical and permanently sustainable 
energy resources in an environmentally acceptable manner, and to conserve our 
finite and expensive energy resources and provide for their most efficient and 
economic utilization." Utah Code§ 54-12-1(2). 
d. The "State Energy Policy" is that: "Utah will promote the study of nuclear power 
generation." Utah Code§ 63M-4-30l(c). 
16 
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e. The state has also codified the Western Interstate Nuclear Compact, which 
provides that its "board shall have power to: (a) Encourage and promote co-
operation among the party states in the development and utilization of nuclear and 
related technologies and their application to industry and other fields." Utah 
Code§ 19-11-201. Art. V. 
f. The Utah Legislature, Emery County, and Green River City have specifically 
expressed support for the Project to be built. 
Conclusion of Law Concerning More Beneficial Use of Water 
The Court finds reason to believe that the Project will not interfere with the more 
beneficial use of the water. 
The proposed plan is physically feasible. 
Findings: 
46. Blue Castle has secured sufficient property in Emery County, Utah on which to locate the 
Project, through a combination of purchase and options to purchase such property. 
47. Blue Castle has selected this particular site because it meets the Project's needs for 
proximity to rail transportation, an interstate highway, electrical transmission lines, and, 
of course, to water. 
48. Under the supervision of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC"), the Project has 
conducted geologic testing, archaeological studies, installed seismic monitoring 
equipment, and has completed approximately 50% of the NRC Early Site Permit 
application, at a total cost of $17.5 million to date. No physical impediments have been 
identified that would prohibit construction of the Project. 
49. An early site permit (ESP) resolves site safety, environmental protection, and emergency 
preparedness issues independent of a specific nuclear plant design. 
50. The ESP application must address the safety and environmental characteristics of the site 
and evaluate potential physical impediments to developing an acceptable emergency 
plan. 
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51. The NRC documents its findings on site safety characteristics and emergency planning in 
a Safety Evaluation Rep01i and on environmental protection issues in Draft and Final 
Environmental Impact Statements. 
52. The ESP process does not require a reactor design to be chosen at this point, and Blue 
Castle has not done so. The Utah statute at issue does not require that Blue Castle 
produce a final plant design at this point, only that the plan be physically feasible. The 
basic elements of the Project are known and are feasible. 
Conclusions Concerning Physical Feasibility: 
Utah has not directly addressed the issue of physical feasibility as it is applied to 
applications to change the point of diversion or to appropriate water. In Bullock v. Hanks, 452 
P .2d 866, 867 (Utah 1969), the Utah Supreme Court upheld a trial court's approval of an 
application to appropriate water, where the district court had found that "it would appear that an 
enlargement [of an irrigation ditch] would not be physically impossible ... " In City of Hilldale v. 
Cooke, 2001 UT 56, ~~22-34, 28 P.3d 697, the Supreme Court discussed the determination of 
"highest and best use" of property in the context of valuing land for condemnation. The Court 
held that ''highest and best use must reflect only 'potential development [that] could with 
reasonable certainty be expected with respect to the property.'" Id at ,I23. The Court further 
held that "a property's highest and best use includes only those uses that are feasible, not those 
that are merely possible." Id One of the three elements of feasibility is "that the use is 
physically feasibly -- that the land is physically suited or adaptable to the potential use." Id. at 
,I24. 
Using these two criteria, the Court concludes from the evidence presented that there is 
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reason to believe the proposed plan is physically feasible because the physical site proposed for 
the Project so far meets all the criteria necessary for the construction of the proposed works. 
The proposed plan is economically feasible. 
Findings: 
53. Utah is the third fastest growing state in the United States, and its growth rate increased 
23.8% between 2000 and 2010. 
54. PacifiCorp, the parent company of Rocky Mountain Power, which produces the majority 
of electricity for the state of Utah, forecasts the growth in Utah will increase the load 
demand for electricity 1.2% per year between 2013 and 2020. 
55. The demand forecast takes into consideration increased efficiency and demand-side 
management, including steps to encourage the effic~ent use of electricity resources. 
a. Even with increased efficiency, the Governor forecasts a growth load between 2% 
and 2.4% per year. 
b. At that growth rate, by 2025 Utah will require 1,440 megawatts of new power 
beyond that currently produced in the state. 
c. By 2025, existing need and new growth load would require between 5,200 and 
5,900 megawatts of electricity. 
d. PacifiCorp's 2013 Integrated Resources Plan (IRP) forecasts a shortage of 2,308 
megawatts of electricity by 2022, which PacifiCorp indicates will be met largely 
by out of state wholesale market purchases. 
e. In 2012, the Governor adopted an energy policy for the state of Utah, and one pa1t 
of that policy identifies an energy initiative challenging Utah power producers to 
construct 25% more generating capacity than the state requires for current power 
needs, for purposes of export. 
f. Problematically, in the 2011 IRP, PacifiCorp has not identified any new resources 
to meet the needs it projects, and forecasts importing electricity to the state as 
early as 2015. 
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56. Natural gas, although currently at an all-time low cost, suffers from similar 
environmental problems as coal, emitting carbon and contributing to visual pollution. 
57. Further, natural gas producers are now beginning to export natural gas to foreign markets 
in the form of liquefied natural gas (LNG) which will likely cause the price of domestic 
natural gas to rise in the near future. 
58. Solar and wind resources in Utah are de minimis at this time, primarily because of cost. 
59. Even assuming the cost of these renewable resources becomes more palatable because of 
the unavailability of coal generation of or natural gas cost increases, neither such resource 
is suitable to produce base load power, that is, electricity available all the time. 
a. Solar power is available normally only about 4 to 5 hours in an average day. 
b. The technology to store wind or solar generated electricity is not available; there 
exists only one pilot project for such storage on a commercial basis in the United 
States at this time. 
60. Nuclear power is ideal for base load power, produces no carbon or particulate emissions 
and does not result in visual pollution. 
61. Blue Castle has had discussions with eighteen utilities expressing an interest in 4,500 
megawatts of power. Based on Blue Castle's water rights, the Project could supply 2,200 
to 3000 megawatts of power. 
62. Blue Castle established the cost-effectiveness of supplying nuclear power. 
63. 98% of Utah's electricity is currently generated by fossil fuel power plants. 
64. It is highly unlikely that any new coal plants will be constructed in Utah, or in the 
western region where the Project would likely serve. 
65. Should carbon capture and/or carbon tax regulations be enacted, it is further highly likely 
that the cost of generation of electricity by the remaining coal power plants and natural 
gas plants in the region will rise significantly. 
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66. Historically, the cost per megawatt hour of nuclear power has been comparable with coal 
and more predictable than natural gas, but the introduction of carbon capture legislation 
or carbon regulation will likely make nuclear power permanently competitive with these 
sources. This is because nuclear's production costs are lower than any other thermal 
resource, thus offsetting nuclear' s higher capital costs. 
67. Nuclear power generation is comparable to or less expensive per megawatt hour than 
solar or wind generation. Because there exists no proven method of storage for wind and 
solar, they are not feasible as base load power. 
68. The price of natural gas, a multi-use fuel, is subject to price fluctuation, and is uncertain. 
Such fuel price fluctuation results in significant electricity price fluctuation. 
69. Nuclear generation is a consistent and stable base load power source, but has extremely 
high construction costs. Future cost projections show that the cost of nuclear power 
generated electricity is equivalent to or cheaper than other alternatives. 
70. It is far from certain that Blue Castle will find partners to construct the nuclear plant 
itself, but Blue Castle's business plan shows the Project, if built, will eventually be 
profitable. 
71. Blue Castle is not required to have a business plan that is ce11ai11 to succeed, but rather it 
is only required to establish that its plan is economically feasible. 
a. Blue Castle's goal at this point is to remove as much risk as possible during the 
licensing phase of the plant, to make the ultimate construction of a nuclear plant 
as attractive to utilities or other investors as possible. 
b. This approach is feasible and is consistent with current practices in the planning, 
construction and financing of nuclear plants. 
72. Even though there are high construction costs associated with a nuclear plant, at this 
point the Court concludes that there is reason to believe the Project is economically 
feasible once operational. 
Conclusions of Law Concerning Economic Feasibility: 
In the context of valuing the use of property in connection with an eminent domain 
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action, the Utah Supreme Court defined "economic feasibility" as evidence that there is 
"sufficient demand for the potential use.,' City of Hilldale, 2001 UT 56, if24. As with the issue 
of physical feasibility, the Utah appellate courts have not specifically ruled on what "economic 
feasibility" means in the context of appropriation of water, pa1ticularly on such a large scale as 
contemplated in the Project. However, the statute's plain language only requires reason to 
believe the proposed plan to use or dive1t the water is economically feasible, regardless of the 
size of the project contemplated. In Bulloct the Utah Supreme Cou1t held: 
Defendants argue that no applicant should be required at the approval 
stage to expend the money to design completely a dam, spillway, and 
other works and to dig test holes and expend other substantial amounts of 
money to assure he has a reservoir site. Such an expenditure is unmerited, 
since the application may be disapproved on some other ground, such as, 
nonavailablity of water. With this contention, we agree; the standard 
applied by this comt in United States v. District Court of Fourth Judicial 
District is equally appropriate in the instant action. 
Bullock, 452 P.2d at 868. 
Utah law does not require the proponents of an application to prove that their entire 
project will be economically feasible by expending all of the required monies at this stage of the 
process. In Bullock, the Court upheld the district court's ruling relative to the economic 
feasibility of a plan to appropriate water by stating: "The State Engineer testified that he merely 
determines if there be a reasonable probability that a dam can be built, that water can be 
impounded, and that water will be available to be impounded, diverted and placed on the lands; 
if these requirements be met, the project is considered feasible. The State Engineer stated that on 
this project he determined whether it could, not would, be feasible." Id. at 867-868. 
The Comt went on to explain: 
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the law provides a period of experimentation during which ways and 
means may be sought to make beneficial use of more water under the 
application before the rights of the parties are finally adjudicated. If we 
were to finally adjudicate applicant's right to change or to appropriate 
water at the time that such application was rejected or approved, he would 
get only such rights as he could establish by a preponderance of the 
evidence that he could use beneficially without interfering with the rights 
of others and in such hearing he would not have the benefit of any 
opportunity to experiment and demonstrate what he could do. Such a 
system would cut off the possibility of establishing many valuable rights 
without a chance to demonstrate what could be done. 
Bullock, 452 P .2d at 868. 
Based on these criteria, the Court concludes that there is reason to believe that the plan 
for the Project is economically feasible. 
Blue Castle has the financial ability to complete the proposed works. 
Findings: 
73. The total cost of the Project through buildout is estimated to be between $15 to $20 
billion, and Blue Castle does not contend that it has the ability to accumulate that amount 
presently or on its own. 
74. Blue Castle has a staged plan to build the Project and is proceeding under 10 CFR Part 
52. 
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a. The cost of obtaining approval for an Early Site Permit (ESP) from the NRC is 
estimated to be in approximately $50 million. 
b. Blue Castle has raised (and spent) $17.5 million so far of the necessary capital to 
obtain the ESP. 
c. It has been working on the Project for over 6 years, and is on target in its 
development plan. 
d. Blue Castle has not borrowed any money at this point, and has met all of its 
financial obligations. 
e. It has conducted preparation, studies, and drafted strategic business plans. 
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f. The Project is a phased process and Blue Castle is not required, at this stage, to 
have the entire project financed to completion. 
75. The approach Blue Castle has adopted for the project (i.e., removing as much risk as 
possible in the early permitting process) makes it more likely that it will eventually find 
strategic partners to construct the power plant itself. 
76. It is clear that financing for nuclear power is inherently risky and that funding is difficult 
and highly selective. However, this does not mean that the Project is impossible. Blue 
Castle has provided sufficient evidence that it is possible, and that there is reason to 
believe that the Project will be completed. 
Conclusions of Law Concerning Financial Ability: 
As with the requirements of physical and economic feasibility, the requirement that the 
applicant have the financial ability to complete the proposed works has had little appellate 
attention in Utah. In Searle, the Utah Supreme Court, in applying the "reason to believe" 
standard to all the statutory criteria of §73-3-8, held that this standard was designed to "provide 
some meaningful barrier so that the floodgates remain closed to all applications except those 
with a sufficient probability of successful perfection." 2006 UT 16, 1[45. This standard is 
applicable to the issue of financial ability. 
As Searle recognized, the change applicant, Blue Castle in this case, "assumes a risk by 
investing time and money in an effott to perfect a proposed change in use that may later be 
effectively disallowed or modified by a court in an adjudicatory proceeding." Id. at 140. This is 
a risk that Blue Castle has assumed, and apart from the water at issue here, no public funds have 
been used on this project. 
Blue Castle has demonstrated an ability to secure funding and capital as needed, on a 
step-by-step basis to capitalize the Project and has a plan to continue capitalizing the Project. 
Accordingly, the Court finds that there exists reason to believe that Blue Castle has the financial 
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ability to complete the Project. 
The Applications were filed in good faith and not for purposes of speculation or 
monopoly. 
Findings: 
77. Blue Castle has a specific plan to use the water for a purpose specifically identified in the 
statute as a beneficial use, not to develop the water only to sell it to others. 
78. While the Project is certainly ambitious, Blue Castle has mapped out a clear pathway to 
achieve its plan. 
79. There is no reason to believe that Blue Castle intends only to monopolize the water. 
80. The fact that Blue Castle does not intend to build the actual power plant itself without the 
assistance of other entities, but rather to intends to market the NRC license through a "de-
risking" process to make the Project attractive to investors, does not amount to 
speculation within the meaning of the statute. Ultimately, if the Project is approved by 
the NRC and built to completion, the water will be put to beneficial use for the statutory 
purpose. 
81. Moreover, Paragraph 9 of the Water Right Lease Agreement between San Juan and Blue 
Castle, dated September 15, 2010, states: 
During the pre-operation payment period, Lessor shall be entitled to use or 
lease all or a portion of the Lease Water not required by Lessee on a short-
term basis, at no cost to Lessor, for so long as the Lease Water is not 
actually required for diversion and use by Lessee." 
82. The Water Right Lease Agreement between Blue Castle and Kane contains similar 
language in Paragraph 15, "Requirements Contract and Use of Water Right," stating: 
Lessor shall be entitled to use, rent, or lease all or a portion of the Lease 
Water not required by Lessee on a short-term basis, at no cost to Lessor, 
for so long as the Lease Water is not actually required for diversion and 
use by Lessee." 
83. These terms provide that the Districts are not deprived of short-term use of the water 
during the development of the Project. 
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84. To date, Blue Castle has spent $17.5 million working on the Project. 
a. None of that money has come from external financing, but instead it has all been 
provided by the investors who are, in turn, part of the project. 
b. Because the private investors are willing to risk enormous amounts of their own 
money and time in the Project, the risk of speculation or monopoly is minimal. 
Conclusions of Law Concerning Speculation or Monopoly: 
When considering the terms "speculation" and "monopoly" the Court looks to the plain 
meaning of the statute, in the context of what the statute intends to regulate. In this case, the 
Plaintiffs claim the Project's ultimate completion is speculative, in that the scope of the Project 
and the money needed to complete the project make it unlikely to succeed, and Blue Castle will 
therefore prevent other uses of the water. However, within the context of §73-3-8, "speculation" 
means holding the water itself for the purposes of speculation. See Western Water, LLC v. Olds, 
2008 UT 18, 18, 184 P .3d 578; "Fifth, the State Engineer concluded that the Original Application 
was fi1ed for speculation or monopoly because the only proposed beneficial use for the water 
was a plan to sell it to others. Indeed, the applicants had 'no lands, facilities, customers, or 
contracts." 
The Court concludes that there is reason to believe the Applications were filed in good 
faith and not for purposes of speculation or monopoly. 
The Applications will not unreasonably affect public recreation._ 
Findings: 
85. The evidence presented at trial establishes that 
a. as an average, 95% of the time the impact of diverting 70 cfs from the Green 
River will have less than a 5% reduction on the flow rate of the river; 
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b. as an average, 99% of the time even with the 70 cfs withdrawal, the discharge of 
the river wilJ be above 700 cfs; 
c. 99% of the time the width of the river will be reduced less than 1.5 feet, out of an 
average width of approximately 350 feet; and 
d. 99% ofthe time the depth of the river would be reduced less than 1.5 inches. 
86. The Applicants presented evidence that public recreation ( e.g., rafting, river running, or 
fishing) would not be affected by the proposed withdrawal. There was no evidence 
presented by the Plaintiffs that public recreation would be affected if the applications 
were approved. 
Conclusions of Law Concerning Public Recreation 
There is reason to believe that the Applications will not unreasonably affect public 
recreation. 
There is reason to believe that the Applications will not unreasonably affect the natural 
stream environment. 
Findings: 
87. The issues raised at trial relative to the natural stream environment primarily focused on 
the effect on endangered species and fallout from the cooling towers. 
88. There exists four species of endangered fish that are unique to the Colorado River 
system. 
89. The stretch of the Green and Colorado Rivers from Flaming Gorge Reservoir to Lake 
Powell includes critical habitat for the endangered fish. 
90. The Green River in particular is designated as critical habitat for the four endangered 
fish, but Blue Castle's expert testimony was that the water withdrawn from the Green 
River would have a de minimus effect on the protected species. 
91. Defendants' expert, Dr. Harold Tyus, testified that there would be an effect, but was 
unable to opine as to the extent of that effect without futther research. 
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a. Dr. Tyus testified that the surface area of the average backwater on the river may 
be reduced by as much as 50%, at times when the river depth would be decreased 
by over 1.5 inches. 
b. However, Dr. Tyus was unsure of the impact of the potential loss of this surface 
area on the fish population. 
92. Testimony from Dr. Hardy, Applicants' expert, indicated that the depth necessary for the 
fish larvae and fry to survive and thrive was between 29 to 38 centimeters (i.e., 
approximately 11 to 14 inches). 
a. The evidence disclosed that with the proposed withdrawal for the Project, 99% of 
the time the flow rate of the river would exceed 700 cfs, and the change in depth 
would be less than 1.5 inches. 95% of the time, the flow rate would be above 
1,300 cfs and the corresponding drop in river depth would be below I inch. 
b. There is no evidence that the proposed withdrawal would have an unreasonable 
impact on the natural stream environment. 
93. The State Engineer acknowledged that the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 
processes would ultimately reach the conclusion of whether the Project would unduly 
impact the natural stream environment and the protected fishes. 
94. In fact, the purpose of NEPA is to address the questions raised by Dr. Tyus. 
a. Based on the NEPA requirement, the State Engineer determined that he had 
reason to believe that the NEPA process would identify measures necessary to 
mitigate negative impact to the natural stream environment. 
b. Regardless of any further investigation by the State Engineer, the Project will be 
subject to NEPA, and the State Engineer conditioned the Application on a 
biological consultation with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, pursuant to 
Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act. 
95. The Upper Colorado River Endangered Fishes Recovery Implementation Program 
Recovery Action Plan (RlPRAP) is a partnership created in 1988 to address the recovery 
of the four endangered fishes in the Upper Basin. 
April 21, 2014 04:28 PM 
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b. Existing diversions are allowed under RJPRAP, as are new diversions. 
c. Utah is a partner in RIPRAP, and the program is supported by the State Engineer. 
d. The goal of RIPRAP is to achieve naturally self-sustaining populations and 
protect the habitat and water flows on which they depend such that the fishes can 
eventually be de-listed. 
e. Requiring a Section 7 consultation will ensure that the Project must cooperate 
with the United States Fish and Wildlife Service ("USFSWS") and the Bureau of 
Reclamation to coordinate releases and take other steps to reach the goals of 
RIPRAP. 
96. The US Bureau of Reclamation is working with the USFWS to develop an operation plan 
for Flaming Gorge Dam releases in order to meet the goals of RIPRAP. 
97. In September 2005, the USFWS released the Final Biological Opinion on the Operation 
of Flaming Gorge Dam. 
a. The Final Opinion stated that the operation of the dam would achieve the flow 
and temperature recommended for the survival of the fishes, while maintaining all 
authorized purposes, including the development of water resources. 
b. Several months later, in February 2006, the Bureau of Reclamation issues a 
Record of Decision ("ROD")(Defense Ex. 20) which stated similar goals. It 
stated: 
The purpose of the proposed action is to operate Flaming Gorge Dam to 
protect and assist in recovery of the populations and designated critical 
habitat of the four endangered fishes, while maintaining all authorized 
purposes of the Flaming Gorge Unit of the Colorado River Storage 
Project (CPSP) including those related to the development of water 
resources in accordance with the Colorado River Compact. [Emphasis 
added.] 
This action is limited to the proposition that avoiding jeopardy and making 
progress toward recovery of listed fish facilitates the ability of the Upper 
Basin States to continue utilizing and further develop their Colorado River 
apportionments. 
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98. If, as Plaintiffs contend, the ROD requires base flows to remain undiverted in the Green 
River to satisfy the requirements of the Endangered Species Act, no one between Flaming 
Gorge and the confluence of the Green and Colorado rivers would be able to divert or use 
any water. 
99. To the contrary, the ROD clearly anticipates further development of the water of the 
Green River and notes a target flow of 1300 cfs. 
100.Utah has developed the "Utah Work Plan 2010" in conformity with the state's 
commitment to RJPRAP. Of the 4 million acre-feet at the Green River, Utah station, only 
1.4 million acre-feet is released from Flaming Gorge Dam. The majority of flows at the 
Green River station, then, come from the tributaries to the Green River downstream from 
the dam. 
101.The Flaming Gorge releases have an impact, clearly, but make up much less than half of 
the available water at the Green River station. 
I 02. The NRC has promulgated comprehensive regulations (Environmental Standard Review 
Plan, 5 .2.1. Hydro logic Alterations and Plant Water Supply)(Defense Ex. 51) with regard 
to the hydrologic alterations that a nuclear plant may cause, including minimizing any 
"adverse environmental impacts." 
103.The NRC Regulatory Guide 4.7, General Site Suitability Criteria for Nuclear Power 
Stations (Defense Ex. 52), in conformance with NEPA, also outlines the comprehensive 
study to be undertaken by the NRC and the applicant. 
a. This process allows for public comment. See 10 CPR Part 51 et seq. "Numerous 
public meetings ... are held during the course of the reactor licensing process." 
Backgrounder, pg. 2.2 
b. The NEPA review includes analyses of impacts to air, water, animal life, 
vegetation, natural resources, and property of historic, archaeological, or 
architectural significance. 
c. Both of these regulatory guides call for close examination of the effect that the 
operation of the plant will have on the Green River, and specifically include the 
impact of the cooling system with regard to drift and its effect on the natural 
2 The Court was provided with an NRC Backgrounder, titled "Nuclear Power Plant Licensing 
Process." That document is referred to as "Backgrounder." 
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vegetation and crops in the vicinity of the Project site. 
d. The review also evaluates cumulative economic, social, cultural, and other 
impacts and environmental justice. 
e. Accordingly, even if the State Engineer were to have expended the significant 
resources necessary to address the Plaintiffs' concerns by conducting further 
studies, the NRC and NEPA requirements are not optional, and cannot be 
circumvented by anything the State Engineer requires. 
f. Further, neither the State Engineer nor this Court is equipped to study cooling 
system design or drift. If Blue Castle is unable to comply with the requirements 
of the NRC, an ESP will not issue. 
I 04.Given the compulsory federal regulations and the burden of proof at this point in the 
proceedings under Utah law, it would be unnecessary and inappropriate for this Court to 
attempt to make a final determination of whether the Project will have any unreasonable 
effect on the natural stream environment. 
105.Because of the comprehensive nature of the NRC review process, and the information 
presented at trial regarding the likely effect on the Green River and its biota, the Court is 
convinced that there is reason to believe that there will not be any unreasonable effect on 
the natural stream environment. 
Conclusions of Law Concerning Natural Stream Environment 
There is reason to believe that the approved Applications will not unreasonably affect the 
natural stream environment of the Green River. 
The Applications are not detrimental to the public welfare. 
Findings: 
106.AII nuclear power plant applications must undergo a safety review, an environmental 
review and antitrust review by the NRC. 
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I 07.In order to construct or operate a nuclear power plant, an applicant must submit a Safety 
. Analysis Report. 
a. This document contains the design information and criteria for the proposed 
reactor and comprehensive data on the proposed site. 
b. It also discusses various hypothetical accident situations and safety features of the 
plant that prevent accidents or, if accidents should occur, lessen their effects. 
c. In addition, the application must contain a comprehensive assessment of the 
environmental impact of the proposed plant." (From the US NRC Backgrounder). 
108.In July 2011, the NRC issued a report concluding that "a sequence of events like the 
Fukushima accident is unlikely to occur in the United States and some appropriate 
mitigations measures have been implemented, reducing the likelihood of core damage 
and radiological releases." 
109.The Court has considered that the Central Utah Project (CUP) supplies water for 
municipal purposes to more than 600,000 people on the Wasatch Front, has expended 
significant taxpayer funds, puts water to beneficial use, and provides for the general 
health and welfare of the public. 
a. The Project's potential impact on CUP would impact the general welfare of a 
large segment of Utah's population center. 
b. The State Engineer determined, and the Court agrees, that the Kane County Water 
Conservancy District Application should be subordinated for purposes of priority 
distribution of water rights held by entities for use in the CUP. 
c. With this condition in place, the Court finds that there is reason to believe that the 
Applications will not be detrimental to the public welfare. 
I I 0. The Court finds that the additional conditions imposed by the State Engineer are 
reasonable and necessary and hereby adopts those conditions. 
Conclusions of Law Concerning Public Welfare: 
"The existing Utah and federal pollution regulation schemes impose a dimension of 
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control separate and apart from appropriation and allocation." Michele Engel, Water Quality 
Control: The Reality of Priority in Utah Groundwater Management, 1992 Utah L. Rev. 491, 
508 (1992). 
The nuclear power industry is heavily regulated by the NRC. Under the Atomic Energy 
Act of 1954 (the "Act"), the NRC is responsible for the development and regulation of nuclear 
energy, radiological health, and the safety of the public. 42 U.S.C. §2021 is the Federal-State 
amendment, which provides that the NRC retains sole authority and responsibility with respect to 
the construction and operation of nuclear production or utilization facilities. 42 U.S.C. §2021 
allowed the State of Utah to enter into an agreement that gives Utah the authority to license and 
inspect byproduct, source, or special nuclear materials used or possessed within Utah. That 
authority is exercised by the Utah Department of Environmental Quality's Radiation Control 
Board ("UDEQ RCB"), but their authority does not, and cannot, extend to the construction or 
operation of nuclear power plants. 
The UEDQ RCB has the authority to make rules to protect the public and environment 
within Utah from significant sources of radiation, mainly from radioactive waste or the source 
materials. Utah Code §19-3-104(4) states: "The board may make rules: (a) necessary for 
controlling exposure to sources of radiation that constitute a significant health hazard"; however, 
the scope of Utah's authority is limited and does not include the construction or operation of 
nuclear power plants, which cannot be delegated by the NRC. See 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (c) 
"Commission regulation of certain activities:" 
April 21, 2014 04:28 PM 
No agreement entered into pursuant to subsection (b) of this section shall 
provide for discontinuance of any authority and the Commission shall 
retain authority and responsibility with respect to regulation of-(1) the 
construction and operation of any production or utilization facility or any 
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uranium enrichment facility ... 
The federal statute, according to Barnson v. United States, 816 F.2d 549, 554 (10 th Cir. 
1987), references "production facility" for the manufacture of "special nuclear material," not the 
extraction of "source material," such as uranium. The federal Act largely preempts the 
regulation of commercial nuclear power plants at the state and local level. However, the Act 
provides and allows for state and local involvement. The US Supreme Court, in Pacific Gas & 
Elc. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm 'n. 461 U.S. 190, 211-12 (1983), said: 
[F]rom the passage of the Atomic Energy Act in 1954, through several 
revisions, and to the present day, Congress has preserved the dual 
regulation of nuclear-powered electricity generation: the Federal 
Government maintains complete control of the safety and "nuclear" 
aspects of energy generations; the States exercise their traditional 
authority over the need for additional generative capacity, the type of 
generating facilities to be licensed, land use, ratemaking, and the like. 
According to the U.S. Supreme Court, NRC licenses "can be issued only consistently 
with the health and safety of the public. But the responsibility of safeguarding the health and 
safety belongs under the statute to the Commission." Power Reactor Development Co. v. 
International Union, 367 U.S. 396, 404 (1961). The NRC will address the Project's impact on 
surface and groundwater, physical and environmental aquatic impact, and potential discharge 
(from the air or otherwise) into surface water and groundwater, and potential surface and 
groundwater contamination issues. There is reason to believe that a nuclear power plant 
constructed under the NRC licensing processes will not be detrimental to the public welfare. 
In addition, the State Engineer will continue to retain jurisdiction to participate in the 
review and approval ( or disapproval) of diversion structure plans and the construction of water 
storage facilities, when such plans are made known. 
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While concerns regarding radiological health are valid, based on NRC review and state 
oversight of the Radiation Control Board and the State Engineer, together with a lack of evidence 
indicating negative health or safety impacts from the construction or operation of the nuclear 
power facility, the Court finds that there is reason to believe that neither the NRC nor the state 
Depai1ment of Environmental Quality's Radiation Control Board, will allow the Project to 
proceed in a manner which will be detrimental to the public welfare or safety. 
This Court's initial threshold determination that there is reason to believe that the Project 
will not prove detrimental to the public welfare is the first of many that must be made in the 
Projecfs process. See Power Reactor, 367 U.S. at 407 ("We think the great weight of the 
argument supports the position taken by the PRDC and by the Commission, that Reg. 50.35 
permits the Commission to defer a definitive safety finding until operation is actually licensed.") 
Based on the compulsory and stringent NRC review regarding health and safety issues, 
together with state oversight of the source materials and waste, the Court has reason to believe 
that the proposed plan will not prove detrimental to the public welfare. 
JUDGMENT 
A. Applications a35402 and a35874 are approved subject to the following conditions: 
1. The diversion and depletion under Application 89-74 (a35402) is limited to 29,600 
acre-feet annually and under Application 09-462 (a35874) to 24,000 acre-feet 
annually; the total rate of diversion may not exceed 75 cfs. 
2. Blue Castle shall install and maintain measuring and totalizing recording devices to 
meter all water diverted from the Green River and shall annually report the data to the 
Division of Water Rights Water Use Program. 
3. Blue Castle shall successfully complete a Section 7 consultation with the USFWS and 
comply with all required conservation measures. 
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4. Prior to altering the natural channel or construction of any diversion structure, Blue 
Castle must file and receive approval of a Stream Alteration Permit with the Division 
of Water Rights. See Utah Code 73-3-29 and Rule R655-13 of the Utah 
Administrative Code. 
5. If a dam or any water impounding structure is constructed, Blue Castle must provide 
the Dam Safety Section of the Division of Water Rights with the plans and 
specifications. See Utah Code 73-5a-101 et seq. and Rule 655-11 of the Utah 
Administrative Code. Construction of the dam or other structure may only 
commence once the necessary authorizations are obtained. 
6. Acquisition of all necessary easements, rights of way, or title to property must be 
obtained prior to construction. 
7. Blue Castle must comply with all local, state and federal statutes, ordinances, and 
rules in connection with the construction of the project. 
8. The Applications are subject to prior rights, and the Kane County Water Conservancy 
District Application is expressly subordinated to the water rights held by various 
entities for use in the CUP for purposes of priority distribution of water. 
B. After an application is approved, an applicant is empowered to construct all necessary 
works and use the water in the manner contemplated by the change application. 
However, no water will be diverted or used until such time as all other regulatory 
requirements are met. 
C. The water must be put to beneficial use and proof filed on or before September 30, 2015 
for Application No. 89-74 (a35402) and on or before November 30, 2017 for Application 
No. 09-462 (a35874). Requests for extension may also be filed. Otherwise the 
Applications will lapse pursuant to Utah law. 
D. As the prevailing parties, Kane and San Juan County Water Conservancy Districts and 
Blue Castle Holdings are entitled to their costs pursuant to Rule 54(d) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, to be established by a memorandum of costs. 
------------------------END OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND JUDGMENT----
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